Past Presence: Aesthetics and the Creation of Origin by Reynolds, Christine Sara, 1981-
PAST PRESENCE: AESTHETICS AND THE CREATION OF ORIGIN 
by 
CHRISTINE SARA REYNOLDS 
A THESIS 
Presented to the Department of Philosophy
 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
 
for the degree of
 
Master of Arts
 
March 2008 
11 
''Past Presence: Aesthetics and the Creation of Origin," a thesis prepared by Christine Sara 
Reynolds in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master ofArts degree in the 
Department of Philosophy. Ibis thesis has been approved and accepted by: 
Dr. J'iiLysR;.!'6,air ofthe &amillIDg Commrttee . 
B (., If) ~ 
Date I 
Committee in Charge: Dr. John Lysaker, Chair 
Accepted by: 
Dean of the Graduate School 
III 
An Abstract of the Thesis of 
Christine Sara Reynolds for the degree of Master of Arts 
in the Department of Philosophy to be taken March 2008 
Title: PAST PRESENCE: AESTHETICS AND THE CREATION OF ORIGIN 
Approved: 
Dr. John Lysaker 
In this essay, I propose a method by which humans may understand themselves in 
relation to our imagined origin. Many believe that humanity's origin offers great insight into 
our present condition, yet its historical distance renders it unknowable. I suggest, drawing on 
Martin Buber, that we engage our origin as a You; that is, we gain self-knowledge by 
confronting the otherness of our origin. This sort of encounter may be accomplished through 
engagement with works of art that embody or represent our origin. In two chapters I 
respectively discuss artistic representations of nature and interpretations of the Paleolithic cave 
paintings of Lascaux, France. Through my evaluation of these two examples, I conclude that 
human meaning comes from our ability to encounter others, and that every moment in which 
we are addressed by otherness is a moment of creation. 
IV 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
NAME OF AUTHOR: Christine Sara Reynolds 
PLACE OF BIRTH: San Francisco, California 
DATE OF BIRTH: August 16, 1981 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATIENDED: 
University of Oregon, Eugene
 
Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
Master of Arts, Philosophy, University of Oregon 
Bachelor of Arts, Art History and Visual Culture Studies, Whitman College 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
Aesthetics
 
Philosophy of Dialogue
 
Critical Theory
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
Graduate Teaching Fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, 2007 
Administrative Assistant, Society for Interdisciplinary Feminist Phenomenology, 
Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, Eugene, 2007 
Administrative Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, 
Eugene, 2006-2007 
Public Art Intern, Regional Arts and Culture Council, Portland, Oregon, 2005 
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS: 
Distinction in Major Study, Department ofArt History and Visual Culture Studies, 
Whitman College, 2004 
----_._---_.__._-------------­
v 
Cum Laude, Whitman College, 2004 
Alexander J. Anderson Academic Scholarship, Whitman College, 2000 
VI 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Dr. John Lysaker, whose combination of intellectual rigor and 
enthusiasm for his students' work is unparalleled by any other educator I have met. Itwas an 
honor and a pleasure to have worked with him on this project. I would also like to thank my 
parents, Richard and Marianne Reynolds, for never questioning the pragmatic value of a 
graduate degree in philosophy and for supporting me in everything I do. And finally, I would 
like to thank my partner, Daniel Spitzer, who has been a daily source of love and 
encouragement during my time at the University of Oregon, not to mention a provocative 
philosopher in his own right. 
Vll 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 1
 
II. "UNCORRUPTED": NATURE, ART AND THE UTOPIAN LONGINGS
 
OF AN ALIENATED WORLD 8
 
Introduction 8
 
Nature as Pre-Historical Heterotopia 9
 
Leisure and the Refuge of the Alienated "I"........................................................... 15
 
Aesthetics and the Utopian Mirror-Image 20
 
Bierstadt's LJoking Down Yosemite Valley, California 24
 
"New": A Utopian Vision for the Alienated I 33
 
False Utopia and the Hidden Production of Irresponsibility 37
 
Reclaiming Utopia through Aesthetics of Negation.............................................. 41
 
Conclusion: Nature's Otherness within Us............................................................. 48
 
III. PRIMAL ENCOUNTERS: A MODERN HISTORY OF LASCAUX 51
 
Introduction 51
 
Lascaux: Away from Animality 53
 
False Assumptions of Relation 58
 
"More Clearly than All Clarity": The Possibility of Encounter at Lascaux 63
 
Aura: ''The Unique Apparition of a Distance" 68
 
The Auratic History of an Endangered Origin 74
 
Lascaux Today and the Aura of the First Modem Moment 80
 
Reframing the Possibility of Encounter 84
 
Conclusion: The Meaning ofLascaux 88
 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE CREATION OF ORIGIN 93
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 99
 
V111 
LIST OF FIGURES 
F~e P~ 
1. Albert Bierstadt, LJoking Down Yosemite Va/fry, California 25
 
2. Anonymous, New 34
 
3. Human figure, Lascaux 57
 
4. Pony, Lascaux; detail of white fungal deterioration 86
 
1 
CHAPTER I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Most human endeavors are in some way justified or conditioned by a notion of their 
origin. Politicians, for example, tend to evaluate contemporary affairs on the basis of their 
adherence to values associated with a nation's founding moments. The astrophysicist's 
theory of celestial bodies is preconditioned by a belief concerning how the cosmos came into 
being. Sociobiologists attempt to make sense of contemporary human biology and behavior 
through speculation on the needs and hardships of our earliest ancestors. And the practices 
of nearly every religion relate in some way to a supposed creation story. The act of positing 
and referring to a primordial moment is, I suggest, pervasive in human life. 
Michel Foucault, in his essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," examines the 
concept of origin as such, and gives an argument as to why our beliefs and actions gravitate 
toward the positing of origin, and what sort of insight or satisfaction we hope to derive 
therefrom: 
We tend to think that this is the moment of their greatest perfection, when they 
emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator or in the shadowless light of a first 
morning. The origin always precedes the Fall. It comes before the body, before the 
world and time; it is associated with the gods, and its story as always sung as a 
theogony.l 
In the search for the origin of a phenomenon, Foucault argues that we implicitly hope to 
discover its objectively perfect, unambiguous essence. The origin, as "before the body," and 
1 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," trans. Donald F. Brouchard and Sherry Simon, Essential 
Works ofMichel FOllfalllt 1954-1984, vol. 2, Aesthetic'S, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, (New York: 
The New Press, 1998), 372. 
2 
"associated with the gods" is also transi'endent: Achieving a clear understanding of an origin is 
akin to a spiritual epiphany. Although the origin is crucial to our identity, it is also a moment 
characterized by elements that profoundly differ from our present condition as embodied, 
fmite, and fallible beings. 
As one might already be able to deduce, Foucault argues that the method for 
uncovering an origin of this sort devolves into absurdity. The seeker of origin must achieve a 
"vantage point of an absolute distance, free from the restraints of positive knowledge 
[i'onnaissani'C]."z In this space of epistemic distance, we hope to remove ourselves from the 
imperfect, contingent biases characteristic of our present situation. In order to :find this 
absolute distance, Foucault claims we develop a: 
field of knowledge [savoitj whose function is to recover it, but (it is) always in a false 
recognition due to the excesses of its own speech. The origin lies at a place of 
inevitable loss, the point where the truth of things is knotted to a truthful discourse, 
the site of a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost.3 
According to Foucault, the discovery of absolute origin requires an intellectual distance 
which is impossible to achieve due to the inevitable limits of the discourses established in its 
pursuit. The finitude of our language, our perspective and our bodies prevents us from 
achieving the objectivity necessary to comprehend the essential truth that we seek in origin. 
As a result, theories of origin are likely to tell us more about the society that produced them 
than they do the origins themselves. 
Foucault's critique of the search for origin is a preamble to his praise of genealogy, 
the Nietzschean approach to philosophical history. According to Nietzsche, we cannot 
understand a phenomenon by seeking its primal moment; we must look instead to the 
Z Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
3 
"exteriority of accidents.,,4 In other words, although we associate the origin with 
unambiguous and essential truth, our present conditions are more accurately explained as the 
repercussions of our historical failures, which we may deem as "exterior" due to the 
concrete, localizable interrelation of persons, objects, species, and communities that gave rise 
to these failures. 
For example, according to this view an account of Christianity that begins and ends 
with the religion's supposed origins is neither informative nor acceptable. Instead of simply 
recounting the story that humans were created in God's image and that God sacrificed his 
son to redeem mankind, Foucault might say that we need to consider the ways in which 
Christianity has been practiced, which would include events such as the decimation of 
indigenous non-Western religious practices during periods of European colonization, recent 
sex abuse scandals among Catholic clergy, and the role of the American religious right in the 
perpetuation of the Iraq War. To be sure, some of these acts have been motivated by 
Christians' desire to act in accordance with the supposed original will of God, but they have 
also been informed by social, political and economic demands, such as, in the last example, 
the American need for oil, and a history of controversial and divisive intervention in the 
Middle East by Western nations. Therefore, actions and agendas pursued in the name of 
Christianity are not implicitly contained in its origin, but are also informed and/or reinforced 
by other events and ideologies. And ifwe choose to privilege the search for origin, we risk 
forgetting the plurality of historical interrelations in which we are implicated. 
I appreciate Nietzsche and Foucault's genealogical approach to history, which 
. recognizes moments of insight and truth in the banal, shameful, transitory, and "exterior" 
4 Ibid., 374 
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moments in human life. However, I also think that the concept of the primordial, as 
articulated and critiqued by Foucault, is too meaningful to human life for us to reject 
outright. As my aforementioned example of Christianity suggests, the positing of origin is 
not without its dangers, as it can allow us to forget the historical atrocities that have 
contributed to our present state. Yet I also believe that because of the extraordinary and 
irreconcilable tension between our identification with and our otherness from our supposed 
origin, a proper relation to our origin can aid us in the cultivation of ethical responsibility. 
I should make clear from the very beginning that the measure by which I evaluate 
ethical behavior is not a set of positively defined virtues or values, nor is it a model of right 
or wrong action. Rather, drawing on the work of twentieth-century Jewish philosopher 
Martin Buber, I consider ethics from the standpoint of relationaliry. The attitude with which 
one engages another being will determine the capacity she will have to act responsibly 
toward the other, and is thus more informative of ethical behavior than the actions 
themselves or the virtues expressed therein. In his 1923 book I and Thou, Buber argues that 
human life in all its aspects cannot be explained without reference to our relations and 
interactions with each other, objects, non-human organisms, and (for Buber, at least) God. 
The ideal intersubjective attitude is for Buber the "I -You" relation, in which the subject 
finds herself addressed by another being, and responds in tum with her whole being.5 This 
relation, with its mysteriously simple definition, is the precondition for the meaning that is 
possible to discover and create in our lives. When one responds to another with her whole 
being, she encounters that other as a unity of inexhaustibly rich significance. Moreover, this 
relation is reciprocal: by allowing ourselves to be addressed in like manner, we in tum are 
5 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), 54. 
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empowered, because for Buber, one becomes a subject, or "I" when one is engaged as such 
by another subject. Thus according to the logic of the I-You encounter, self-knowledge is 
dependent on our capacity to remain open and responsible to the others that address us. 
I therefore consider it especially fruitful to bring the idea of an I-You relation to the 
problem of how humans should posit or refer to origins. By way of its radical otherness 
from our contemporary existence, while at the same time laying claim to our essential 
identity, I suggest that the relationship we cultivate with our origin should be akin to that of 
an I-You encounter. However, because an "origin" is an easily abstractable phenomenon, 
unlike a person, organism or object, I will focus my investigation on the lived experiences in 
which we believe ourselves to be gleaning insights into our primordial being. And these 
experiences, I suggest, fall under the domain of the aesthetic. While many philosophers have 
disagreed over the exact nature of the aesthetic experience, most would agree that it requires 
a subject to perceptually engage a phenomenon; that is, the experience is embodied. Moreover, 
the subject considers her engagement with an aesthetic phenomenon to be a disruption from 
her everyday world. Without speculating on the supposed meaning or content of the 
aesthetic experience, I'd like to suggest that this most basic definition reveals a tension 
between otherness and relation that we ftnd in the I-You encounter. That is, one experiences 
a disruption, or something other from ordinary life that happens to be present, and thus in 
embodied, perceptual relation to oneself and her everyday world. The chapters that follow 
will examine two distinct yet interrelated experiential phenomena in which we believe to ftnd 
insight into the origins of human life, and I will examine the art objects and aesthetic 
experiences that work to sediment the meanings associated with those experiences. 
------ ----
6 
-------_. _._------------­
My next chapter deals specifically with the notion of the extrahistoncalorigin; that is, 
the idea that human identity is explained and affIrmed by that which presupposes humanity 
but does not include it. This particular concept of origin is experientially revealed to us in the 
idea of nature as a pre-historic, pleasurable, righteous, and meaningful realm "pure" of 
human corruption and influence. I will examine the ways in which this experience of nature 
is informed by the capacity of works of art to express utopian values that resist, but are 
definitively born from particular cultural conditions with which aesthetically engaged social 
subjects are dissatisfied. I will examine the dangers of conflating the utopian desire for pre­
historic-nature with nature as such, and suggest that in order to relate to nature responsibly, 
we must be aware of the role that our lived experience of alienated labor plays in our 
aesthetic preferences, and that we must cultivate an aesthetic attitude that is vigilantly 
attuned to the false expressions of our utopian beliefs about nature. 
The third chapter considers a different sort of origin: the moment of beginning or 
birth. When attempting to understand the moment in which humans developed the self­
consciousness that sets us apart from other life forms, scholars from several fields have 
referred to Paleolithic art as key evidence of this transformative period. And because of the 
remarkable aesthetic effect it has on the contemporary viewer, the cave paintings of Lascaux, 
France are considered to be one of the more significant relics of early human consciousness. 
I suggest that the contemporary subject sees Lascaux as a remnant of our transition out of 
animality, a transition would thus imply a simultaneous otherness from and relation to the 
more-than-human world. However, I argue that in order to apprehend this relational tension 
evident in the paintings, we must similarly attempt to maintain a sort of distance in our own 
historical relation to Lascaux. I articulate what this engagement would look like through an 
7 
immanent critique of the conventional means by which Lascaux is studied and experienced 
today, which, I suggest, assimilate the cave into a network of contemporary meanings that 
dictate what we think an original artwork of this sort should mean for us. 
In both discussions, I hope to show that the evaluation of an aesthetic experience 
requires us to look at the encounter between subject and object, and the significance of 
otherness and relation for this encounter. To keep both relation and otherness in play is 
more difficult than it may seem, but I suggest that when we succeed, a proper engagement 
with works relating to our origin will allow us to be addressed by the otherness of our past 
within the present. Moreover, I argue that the conditions for an aesthetic engagement of this 
sort allow us recreate in our own lives the insight we hope to glean from the aesthetic object 
itself. Recall that for Buber, an I-You encounter is the precondition for the creation of 
meaning. Therefore, I conclude that aesthetic objects offering insight into our origin do so 
precisely because our engagements with them allow us to realize our capacity to be originators 
of meaning and possibility, an insight that we can then bring to the problems of the present. 
8 
CHAPTER II
 
"UNCORRUPTED": NATURE, ART AND THE UTOPIAN LONGINGS OF AN
 
ALIENATED WORLD
 
Introduction 
In attempting to posit humanity's origin, some have chosen to articulate the 
conditions that gave rise to humanity rather than the moment of inception itself. If a 
supposed origin is believed to shed insight into human nature and to help us re-evaluate our 
actions and values, it follows that a search for thepre-historic conditions of our birth may 
promote a critical stance toward human history. This chapter will focus on one particular 
manifestation of this reverential regard for the pre-historic, namely, the idealization of nature 
as a space untrammeled by human historical influence, thereby offering redemption and/or 
rejuvenation. Drawing primarily on the work of philosophers Michel Foucault, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Martin Buber, and Theodor Adorno, as well as environmental historians William 
Cronon and Jennifer Price, I examine and then critique some factors that have contributed 
to our belief that nature is "pure" of or "uncorrupted" by human impact and is thus is 
capable of restoring or renewing those who experience alienation from their own society. I 
will discuss how the desirable, restorative experience with a supposedly "pure" nature is 
itself a cultural construction, and is the result of our attempts to give concrete vision to the 
values that we believe to resist intolerable social conditions. 
9 
This attempt to identify oneselfwith an imagined "other" to the society in which one 
is embedded is an example of utopian desire, and its expression, I suggest, can be found in 
works of art. I will thus undergo two interrelated analyses of aesthetic objects that give vision 
to the utopian desire to escape the corruption of history and the alienation we feel from our 
"true" or "original" selves. The ways in which these objects are produced, disseminated and 
consumed are revealed to actually perpetuate the same alienating, corruptive social forces 
they promise to resist. Although this realization threatens to discourage the reader from 
believing that there is any viable mode of resisting the alienation of social life, I conclude by 
articulating a particular sort of aesthetic attitude that may allow us to engage nature in a more 
responsible way. 
Nature as Pre-Historical Heterotopia 
In our day-to-day lives, we experience ourselves and the world against a backdrop of 
what we, on the surface, believe to be a uniform and predictable passage of time. This 
assumed temporal continuum, however, is brought to the forefront of our thoughts when 
that time it is somehow disrupted, when five minutes feels like eternity, or an afternoon 
passes us by in the blink of an eye. Often, these experiences occur within a specific context. 
When vacationing in a tropical resort, one may feel as though each day idyllically repeats 
itself, liberated from the ongoing deadlines ofwork and responsibilities of home. Or, after 
watching a film with a plot that spans weeks, months, or even years, and the action is set in 
various distant locales, one may exit the theater feeling disoriented, not knowing what time it 
is or where the car is parked. 
10 
Foucault, in a 1967 essay tided "Different Spaces," deals explicitly with this 
phenomenon, and argues that the experience of temporal and spatial rupture actually 
structures the perceived continuity of everyday life. He begins by distinguishing two types of 
"different spaces": utopias and heterotopias. For Foucault, a utopia, or ideal "no-place," is 
the imagined reversal or perfection of the society in which it is conceived.6 Although a 
utopia by defInition does not, and indeed cannot exist, Foucault describes spaces in which the 
experience of utopia can partially realized. He writes: 
There are also, and probably in every culture, in every civilization real places, actual 
places, places that are designed into the very institution of society, which are sorts of 
actually realized utopias in which the real emplacements, all the other real 
emplacements that can be found within the culture are, at the same time, 
represented, contested, and reversed, sorts of places that are outside all places, 
although they are actually localizable. Because they are utterly different from all the 
emplacements that they reflect or refer to, I shall call these places "heterotopias"...? 
Foucault's examples of heterotopian spaces include not only the vacation resort and the 
cinema (to which I have already alluded), but sites such as the cemetery (a "quasi eternity in 
which [the deceased] perpetually dissolves and fades away"), the museum (a site for the 
indefInite accumulation of time), and the ship (a self-enclosed "placeless place" that 
promises access to any number of exotic locales). 8 In his discussion of these heterotopias, 
Foucault examines the effect each has on our experience of time and space on a general 
level, only superfIcially exploring the ways in which history is brought into relief by movement 
through different spaces. However, I believe that the model provided here can be easily 
applied to this question of history and experience. Are there places that markedly contrast 
6 :Michel Foucault, "Different Spaces," trans. Robert Hurley, Essential Works ofMichel Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 2,
 
Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. James D. Faubion, (New York: The New Press, 1998), 178.
 
7 Ibid.
 
8 Ibid., 182; 184-85.
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with "ordinary" space in the sense that we feel ourselves to be outside history when we 
inhabit them? And what, by way of their contrast with the everyday, can these places tell us 
about our concept of history as it is experienced? 
Indeed, we fInd that there is a type of space, both readily conceived and easily 
localizable (at least at fIrst glance), conceived by more traditional philosophers of history as 
extra-historical, described most generally as nature. Theodore Schatzki, in his article "Nature 
and Technology in History," argues that nature is traditionally understood as anything that is 
neither human nor a product of intentional human activity, and as such, does not have 
history. Rather, nature is a backdrop for the unfolding of human history, providing only the 
space and raw materials for the development of culture, and only considered a participant in 
history when it is somehow transformed or changed by humans, or, in other words, when it 
is no longer nature. 
This definition, according to Schatzki, has its roots in Aristotle's definition of a 
natural object as anything that obeys principles of motion deriving from its inner nature. 
Aristotle contrasts a natural object with a crafted object, the form of which is determined by 
human activity from without.9 We can see this bias informing philosophers of history from 
various eras and traditions. Hegel, for example, argues in his Philosop6' ofNature, that nature 
"exhibits no freedom in its existence, but only necessiry and contingenry."10 This claim is 
signifIcant when one considers the fact that history is for Hegel the dialectical realization of 
universal human freedom. Thus, if history is defined by human freedom, nature, as 
9 Theodore R. Schatzki, "Nature and Technology in History," History and Theory: Studies in the Philosop~ ofHistory 
42, no. 4 (December 2003): 85. 
10 G.W.F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Nature: Introduction," trans. A.V. Miller, The Hegel Reader, ed. Stephen 
Houlgate (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1998),260. (emphasis in original) 
12 
necessary, contingent and non-human, is not a participant. And R.G. Collingwood, in his 
1946 book The Idea qfHiJtory, echoes Hegel with his assertion that history is rightfully limited 
to the study of humans because human action is understood as emerging from the intentions 
of a thinking agent, whereas natural events are explainable as causal processes devoid of any 
teloJ. 11 This particular conception of nature, which we see is common in discourses on the 
philosophies of nature and history, is integral to the binary distinction between "nature" and 
"culture" that has gone relatively unquestioned in Western thought until this past century.12 
While the notion of a sharp dichotomy between nature and culture has been 
influential to theoretical inquiry, widespread belief in this distinction undoubtedly affects 
individual lived experience as well. For this reason, I want to examine "nature" as a 
heterotopic space in which a sense of being "outside" history may be articulated. In line with 
the notion that nature only becomes historical when it is manipulated or altered by human 
activity, out exemplary "natural" spaces will be realms in which we experience a lack of 
human presence or influence. Thus while anything non-human or non-artifactual may be 
considered nature under the given criteria, most would agree that national parks, state 
forests, or wildlife preserves are some of the best places to find and experience nature. For 
here, non-human objects, organisms, and processes are intentionally protected from most 
forms of harmful human impact, and as such, are deemed by some to be "pure" or 
"uncorrupted." 
That these protected spaces are imagined to have a certain kind of purity becauJe they 
have not been transformed or manipulated by humans, is itself a further insight into the 
11 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea ofHistory (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1946),215. 
12 Schatzki, 85-86. 
13 
supposed extra-historical character of nature. Namely, the idea that humanity corrupts 
nature through the enactment of history suggests that nature is not only outside history, but 
that it also necessarily exists bifOre history's advent. Several of the West's most broad 
narratives of origin, whether scientific, religious or cultural, begin with the idea of 
humankind emerging out of nature. Evidence for the theory of evolution, for example, 
indicates that humans descended from "lower" primates who surely lived a life closer to that 
of a chimpanzee or monkey than our present, technology-dependent existence. Judeo­
Christian traditions place the origin of humanity in the Garden of Eden, a lush paradise in 
which humans lived harmoniously with all other created species. And problematically, 
societies that have not developed or adopted technologies commonplace in industrialized 
Western nations are often deemed "backward," "undeveloped," and "primitive," which I 
interpret to be an expression of the belief that those with less or different technologies than 
our own are historically "closer" to their origin in nature. 
If history is considered to be a corruptive influence on prehistorical nature, it may be 
that we perceive nature as bearing some sort of value that humans do not have, or a value 
that humans are capable of destroying. In regard to environmental crises today such as 
pollution, global warming, and species extinction, we know that the preservation of natural 
spaces helps to slow the progression of these dangerous trends. Yet even on an individual 
experiential level, one's entry into a natural space or an encounter with a truly wild 
phenomenon is recognized by us as beneficial. Upon encountering nature, we are reminded 
of the events, cycles, and intricate interspecies relations that occur in a context greater than 
those of civilization, and we are humbled by the richness of existence that lies beyond the 
14 
human world. We may feel as does Ralph Waldo Emerson's imagined "man of the world" in 
his second "Nature" essay, who: 
... at the gates of the forest ... is forced to leave his city estimates of great and 
small, wise and foolish. The knapsack of custom falls off his back with the ftrst step 
he makes into these precincts. Here is a sanctity which shames our religions, and 
reality which discredits our heroes. Here we ftnd nature to be the circumstance 
which dwarfs every other circumstance, and judges like a god all men that come to 
her.13 
In the presence of nature, Emerson suggests that we may experience ourselves and our 
values as arbitrary and comparatively insigniftcant. When we come to demote the relative 
import of our brief lives, nature then appears to have an enduring, eternal, and nearly divine 
authority from which our endeavors may be judged. 
This notion is manifest in our language: actions or beliefs deemed to be morally 
reprehensible are often condemned as "unnatural," while on the other hand, actions or 
beliefs that are argued to be good or simply outside the scope of human judgment are 
claimed to be "natural." For example, many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political 
philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau premised 
their political models in an imagined "state of nature." These philosophers suggest that ifwe 
try to reconstruct how humans would interact without the influence of existing social 
conventions, we would then know what type of political order is best suited to our "natural" 
inclinations and we would have a template for morally just human behavior. In other words, 
because nature is perceived as still "before" history and thus not subject to the differences 
and conflicts that have shaped the development of human societies over time, it may be 
understood as embodying standards of epistemic and moral authority. 
13 Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Nature," Essqys, First and Second Series, ed. Ernest Rhys (London: J.M. Dent and 
Sons, Ltd., 1906), 294. 
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Leisure and the Refuge of the Alienated "I" 
When we pause to consider our cultural relationship with nature as it is expressed in 
historical tenns and lived in individual experience, we fInd that nature is conceived as a pre­
historic "other" to historical human life, an absolute authority in relation to our inconstant 
values, while still vulnerable to our corruptive influence. Yet however much we value and 
wish to honor natural spaces uncorrupted by human presence, the fact remains that there are 
institutions and industries devoted to the facilitation of certain fonns of human activity in 
"pure" nature. These activities, such as hiking, camping, skiing, boating, and recreational 
hunting, are usually defIned as fonns of leisure. 
I defIne these kinds of activities as leisurely for two interrelated reasons. First, the 
concept of leisure contrasts markedly with work, be it economic, domestic or civic. When we 
are not undergoing activities that are direcdy in the service of our employers, our families or 
our local and federal governments, we say that we are enjoying the leisure time in which we 
may engage in activities of our choosing, activities that direcdy benefIt us or bring us 
enjoyment. Second, because so much of our everyday lives are devoted to work, most are 
only able to undergo leisure activities on occasion. Thus I would like to clarify the 
experiential signifIcance of protected natural spaces in relation to the leisure activities 
undergone therein: these places are available to us during the brief and irregular moments in 
which we are free from various social responsibilities, moments in which we are free to act 
for ourselves. Without reading too much into the signifIcance of nature-based leisure 
activities, I want to suggest that a dichotomy between nature and culture plays itself out on 
this experiential level: we reward ourselves with the occasional flight from our social 
16 
responsibilities by heading toward nature which, by contrast to our homes and places of 
work, we perceive as providing a venue for self-gratification. 
This sort of relational dichotomy between the attitude of responsibility in work and 
self-gratification in leisure is the subject of discussion in Buber's I and Thou. The book begins 
with the establishment ofwhat is for Buber a key ontological distinction between the I-You 
relation, and the I-It relation. The I-You relation is a holistic encounter with another being 
which bestows meaning and subjectivity to the self, and in which the other is engaged for its 
own sake. The I-It relation, by contrast, is effected by the self's objectifying attitude toward 
another being in which only aspects of the other are engaged, and are done so under the 
auspices of a purpose articulated by the self. After establishing these key distinctions, Buber 
then argues that contemporary human life is dominated by I-It relations, and that a majority 
of our problems stem from our growing inability to relate to others with the fullness of our 
beings. His discussion of the dichotomy between work and leisure is part of a meditation on 
how the I-It attitude has become so pervasive that we even relate to aspects of our own selves 
as objects or functions circumscribed by purpose. 
Our public working life has become, according to Buber, an "It-district" of 
institutions. He writes: 
Institutions are what is "out there" where for all kinds of purposes one spends time, 
where one works, negotiates, influences, undertakes, competes, organizes, 
administers, officiates, preaches; the halfway orderly and on the whole coherent 
structure where, with the manifold participation of human heads and human limbs, 
the round of affairs runs its course.14 
In the public world of institutions, we work alongside others under the auspices of various 
purposes (to negotiate a business deal, to influence a vote, to undertake a project, etc). We 
14 Buber, 93. 
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may work to fulfill our responsibility for others, such as our employers, our colleagues and 
our government officials, but as Buber implies, the relational attitude we hold toward others 
in the institutional realm is by nature incomplete. In the "It-district," we and the others with 
whom we work with are simply part of a "manifold...ofhuman heads and human limbs." We 
are defined only by work we provide (the ideas that come from our heads, and the 
actualization of those ideas with our limbs), and we define others in like manner. To engage 
others solely in terms of their productivity, and to be engaged by others solely in terms of 
one's own productivity, is Buber's way of defining the lived experience of alienated labor. 
This institutional attitude is for Buber intrinsically o/:jectifying. And although we are complicit 
with the objectification that occurs in the institutional world, the predominance of It-
relations here may leave us feeling unfulfilled, dissatisfied, and in some cases, dehumanized. 
For this reason, Buber argues that when we are not working, we attempt to restore 
ourselves on our own time and in our own spaces. He writes of the "I-district" of feelings: 
Feelings are what is "in here" where one lives and recovers from the institutions. 
Here the spectrum of the emotions swings before the interested eye; here one enjoys 
one's inclination and one's hatred, pleasure and, if it is not too bad, pain. Here one is 
at home and relaxes in one's rocking chair.1s 
Our life outside institutions is thus one in which we indulge and restore our "inner" world of 
feelings that are unrecognized, and indeed, intentionally neglected within the It-district. 
During this personal time, we are "at home" with ourselves, literally or figuratively. Ifwhile 
at work, we feel ourselves to be in the service of the external purposes, here we act in 
accordance with our personal inclinations. 
According to Buber, however, the way we relate to ourselves in this "I-district" has a 
ring of falsity. We willingly and deliberately alienate the aspects of ourselves that dominate 
IS Ibid. 
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our institutional activities in order to indulge and restore our inner world of feelings. Because 
of this, Buber argues that we sever our own personhood, and thus dramatically hinder our 
capacity to relate to the world. He writes, " ...the severed It of institutions is a golem, and the 
severed I of feelings is a fluttering soul-bird. Neither knows the human being... Neither has 
access to actual life. Institutions yield no public life; feelings, no personallife."16 In other 
words, because we engage the institutional world as a golem, which Buber defIned in a later 
version of the text as "an animated clod without a soul,"l? and because we experience our 
"true" selves in our personal time as "fluttering" souls detached from the world, we do not 
in either realm cultivate the unity of self that we need to engage the world with our whole 
being. 
I bring Buber's observation of the schism between institutional and personal life to 
this discussion because I fInd that nature, by way of its association with leisure and 
dissociation from history, is implicated in this relational dilemma. Ifwe, like Emerson's city 
dweller, experience "the knapsack of custom" fall away from us while in the presence of 
nature, then nature is an ideal space for us to recover from institutions and restore our inner 
lives. Yet if we do not bring the more socially entrenched aspects of our being to our 
experience of nature, we risk losing our access to nature's "actual life." In other words, if we 
relate to nature as a venue for our rejuvenation, we are not actually able to encounter nature as 
the radical other that we posit it to be. We may still experience the otherness of nature as 
having a profoundly uplifting and restorative effect on us, but in line with Buber's insights, I 
16 Ibid., 93-94. 
17 Ibid., 93n. 
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suggest that perhaps we have this experience because we are already looking to reject our 
institutional selves when in nature's presence. 
Thus our engagement with nature more can be more readily characterized as a 
relation of an I to an It, since we bring only a part of ourselves to our experience, and 
furthermore, we do so with the purpose of indulging and restoring our inner life; that is, we 
engage nature on our own terms. Because of this, I suggest that we do not enter these 
natural spaces with an attitude of responsibility toward nature. This is not to say that those 
who choose to engage in nature-based leisure activities do not care about the precarious state 
of the environment. Rather, as William Cronon suggests, the framing of nature as a venue 
for extra-historical, leisurely escape blinds us to the areas of our lives in which we act 
irresponsibly toward the environment. He writes: 
We inhabit civilization while holding some part of ourselves-what we imagine to be 
the most precious part-aloof from its entanglements. We work our nine-to-five 
jobs in its institutions, we eat its food, we drive its cars (not least to reach the 
wilderness), we benefit from the intricate and all too invisible networks with which it 
shelters us, all the while pretending that these things are not essential to who we are. 
By imagining that our true home is in the wilderness, we forgive ourselves the homes 
. h b· 18we actua y m 11 a it. 
In other words, although we attribute greater value to the aspects of ourselves that fmd 
satisfaction in nature, we are complicit with the damage done to nature in our more 
"ordinary" socially entrenched lives. Moreover, Cronon suggests that these leisurely 
moments of nature-worship allow us to condone our environmental irresponsibility: If our 
institutional lives do not authentically reflect our "true" selves, then the activities we undergo 
therein are likewise of less significance. By pointing out common discrepancies in the nature­
lover's behavior, such as driving a pollutant-spewing automobile to a remote wilderness 
18 \Villiam Cronon, "The Trouble with Wilderness, or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature," Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996),81. 
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preserve, Cronon illustrates how the relational schism between institutional and inner life 
can also alienate us from our own ability to act responsibly toward the more-than-human 
world. 
As the reader may already be able to deduce, a primary reason for our problematic 
relation with nature is the ambiguity between identity and otherness in our conception of it. 
Nature is simultaneously conceived as a radical other to civilization "pure" of the historical 
corruptive influence of humanity, as well as a restorative "homeland" for the individual 
human, a place in which one can imaginably recover her "true" self. How is it possible that a 
space that we regard as intrinsically corrupted by human presence is at the same time 
conceived as our true and rightful home? 
Aesthetics and the Utopian Mirror-Image 
To answer this question, it may be helpful to return to Foucault's notion of the 
heterotopia. Recall that for Foucault, a heterotopia that offers a contestation or reversal of 
meanings produced in "ordinary" social time is situated in such a way that that it sediments, 
rather than undermines those ordinary meanings. Foucault's method owes much to 
structuralism, and we must note that a structuralist account of meaning depends on the 
coexistence of opposing signs, each bestowing value on the other through their difference. 
Moreover, as Stuart Elden notes in his book Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the 
Project ifa Spatial History, Foucault's unique brand of structuralism heavily utilizes metaphors 
of space. Elden writes that Foucault continually describes structurally opposed concepts 
(such as sickness and health) or historical categories (such as antiquity and modernity) as 
"bounded areas, (and as a result) he is able to investigate the limits or thresholds, and trace 
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the potential of transgression, or egress.,,19 Concepts, then, are defIned as spaces through 
which the discursive subject moves. The distance she must traverse in order to "cross over" 
into another concept becomes the semantic difference that co-defmes the meanings of the 
concept and its other. If his method is indeed, as Elden suggests, saturated with metaphors 
of spatiality, it follows that Foucault understands actual, lived space to function semantically 
in much the same way. Thus, nature, which we may experience as a site of prehistorical 
purity and a bearer of eternal, universal authority, may actually only appear to us in that way 
because of our dissatisfying experience in "ordinary" social space. The real physical isolation 
of protected wilderness spaces from human communities, and the leisure activities typically 
undertaken therein work to sediment the structurally opposed concepts of "nature" and 
"culture," by making their difference map-able and experienceable. 
Emerson makes a similar claim in his aforementioned "Nature" essay, but 
signifIcantly, he frames social production of the nature-culture dichotomy in terms of 
aesthetic-oriented desire. He writes: 
The critics who complain of the sickly separation of the beauty of nature from the 
thing to be done, must consider that our hunting of the picturesque is inseparable 
from our protest against false society. Man is fallen, nature is erect, and serves as a 
differential thermometer, detecting the presence or absence of the divine sentiment 
in man. By fault of our dulness and selfIshness, we are looking up to nature, but 
when we are convalescent, nature will look up to us.20 
Emerson's statement here echoes what I have just suggested about the cultural origin of the 
values we associate with nature. For him, we identify nature with goodness and truth because 
of the falsity and corruption we experience in human society. Yet the framing of this idea in 
19 Stuart Elden, Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project ofa Spatial History (London: Continuum, 
2001),94. 
20 Emerson, 299. 
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the language of aesthetics suggests to me a further, more intriguing insight. Although it is 
unclear if Emerson intended his passage to be read in this way, I still find this idea worthy of 
our attention. Namely, I think it significant that Emerson declares human interest in the 
picturesque to be a form of social protest. The picturesque, an aesthetic category popular in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, refers to natural scenes and vistas that exhibit a 
visual harmony akin to that of a painting. In other words, a picturesque scene naturally bears 
formal unity and compositional balance that landscape painters of that time would 
deliberately and artificially invoke in their works. Thus the picturesque articulates a delight in 
the appearance of human-made values in the more-than-human world: nature is, in this 
moment, how we would like it to be. One may argue, however, that the formal principles of 
the picturesque were first discovered in nature, and were not created by artists and critics ex 
nihilo. Yet the establishment of the picturesque as a canonical aesthetic value suggests that it 
has a discursive identity that is best understood through studying the history of aesthetic 
theory, rather than the study of nature itself. When considered in this way, we may read 
Emerson's passage as suggesting that this particular engagement with nature is a deliberate 
search for harmony and unity as expressed and mediated by the history of a cultural product 
(namely, painting) within a space considered to be outside society, and motivated by the 
apparent lack of harmony and unity within society itself. 
The story of nature as a socially mediated concept can be (and has been) found in 
the history of politics, economics, language and gender, among others. Here, however, I 
would like to consider nature as it appears to us by way of the aesthetic experience and 
works of art. Through this consideration, I hope to expose something of how aesthetic 
experience reveals the deep interdependence of lived experience and cultural values. While I 
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do not intend to focus specifically on the picturesque and how it contributes to our experience 
of nature, I am interested in the idea that the expression of cultural values in aesthetic 
objects plays a significant role in the development of the concept of "nature" as a refuge 
from history. I discuss history of natural space itself, but as Emerson suggests, our 
experience of nature is informed by the values we fail to see in society and hope to find in its 
other. These sorts of values, which I argue are utopian, reveal themselves in an especially 
vivid way within art and the aesthetic experiences we collectively privilege and seek out. 
Foucault spends the majority of his essay "Different Spaces" articulating the concept 
of the heterotopia, a lived, partially realized utopia that offers a reversal or contestation of 
meanings produced within "ordinary" social space. The utopia, he assumes, is already a 
familiar concept with his readers, and so here he only discusses it so as to develop a clear 
idea of the heterotopia. Yet perhaps due to his inclinations toward structuralism, Foucault's 
definition of utopia may differ a bit from our own. The utopia for him is still a "no-place," 
but he does not think that just atry imaginable non-existent scenario is righdy called 
"utopian." Rather, if we take into account his notion of the heterotopia, we fll1d that a 
utopia plays a similarly specific role in the production of cultural meaning. Foucault's best 
explication of utopia perhaps comes in his articulation of the experience of looking in a 
rrurror: 
The mirror is a utopia after all, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror I see myself 
where I am not, in an unreal space that opens up virtually behind the surface; I am 
over there where I am not, a kind of shadow that gives me my own visibility, that 
enables me to look at myself there where I am absent-a mirror utopia.21 
Like the mirror, Foucault's utopia offers a vision of reversal. A society troubled by 
overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions, for example, may respond by producing 
21 Foucault, "Different Spaces," 179. 
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ideals of open space and cleanliness in their cultural discourse. The social subject, as a way of 
expressing her dissatisfaction, may then come to adopt these values as her own, and thus 
"see" herself in the utopian "mirror" where she is not. Reflection on these values, moreover, 
will allow the subject to view her ordinary reality with greater clarity, or to use Foucault's 
language, grant the subject her own visibility. Thus it appears for Foucault that the creation 
of utopian ideals and narratives has a significant social function: through the interplay of 
opposing signifiers, the utopia allows social subjects to both articulate their hardships and 
cultivate values that offer resistance to them. 
I will now analyze a work of art that on a formal level exemplifies the concept of 
pure, pleasurable, pre-historical nature as I have described it thus far. Significantly, the 
history of this work's production and reception also illustrates the potential of a work of art 
to articulate utopian desires. That is, we will be able to see how the creation of a work was 
motivated by a desire to give vision to values that resisted social conditions in which the 
work was produced. Moreover, we can see how public reception of the work depended in 
large part in the perceived effectiveness of the artist's articulation of the utopian otherness 
with which his audience hoped to identify. In the story of this artwork, the tensions between 
culture and nature, its idealized other, will hopefully bring further insight into the problems 
that characterize our contemporary relationship with nature. 
Bierstadt's Looking Down Yosemite Vallry, California 
Albert Bierstadt (1830-1902), a landscape painter whose career spanned the second 
half of the nineteenth century, is little known today outside the fields of art history and 
American studies. His work is generally not regarded as canonical to the history ofAmerican 
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art, but instead as an example of a passing fad, given that his popularity as painter of 
monumental scenes of the American W<;:st reached a nearly unprecedented peak in the 
1860's, and shortly thereafter saw a sharp decline.22 I believe a consideration of one of his 
paintings alongside the social and ideological forces that contributed to his dramatic success 
and near-sudden fall from popularity will be greatly informative of not only art's relation to 
utopia, but the problematic relational attitudes we hold toward more-than-human nature. 
The painting I would W<e to discuss, Looking Down Yosemite Val/ry, California (fig. 1), 
completed in 1865, was one of his more popular works from this period. 
Figure 1. Albert Bierstadt, Looking Down Yosemite Val/ry, California, 1865. Oil on canvas, 64 1;4 
x 96 W', Birmingham Museum of Art, Birmingham, AL. 
22 For a brief biography of Bierstadt, as well as a detailed account of the rise and fall of his public and 
commercial viability, see Linda S. Ferber, "Albert Bierstadt: The History of a Reputation" in Alberl Bierstadt: Arl 
and Enterpnse, ed. Nancy K. Anderson and Linda S. Ferber, 21-68 (Brooklyn: The Brooklyn Museum, 1990). 
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Depicted, as the title suggests, is Yosemite Valley, which at the time had not yet 
become a national park, but was already well known throughout the country as a site of 
extraordinary natural beauty and grandeur. While some photographs and prints ofYosemite 
had been available on the East coast, Bierstadt's painting was the ftrst large- scale, full-color 
. depiction of the valley.23 And at 64 by 96 inches, the painting is certainly enormous; sure to 
visually dominate nearly any space in which it could be exhibited. The scene appears to take 
place at dawn, and the foreground, primarily flat grassland, is dramatically darkened in 
shadow. The eye is led down the valley, flanked by two severe cliff walls. Through the mid-
ground runs a meandering river with golden sunlight reflecting off its calm waters. The far 
distance is obscured by both a bend in the valley and a fIne mist illuminated by the sun's 
rays. These elements of mystery may have been intended to draw the viewer into the 
painting, beckoning her to enter the valley. The rising sun is blocked from view by the cliff 
on the right, and its rays throw both crags into dramatic contrast with the sky, illuminating 
the clouds in shades of purple and pink. 
Here we ftnd no humans depicted, nor are there even animals. Yet despite the lack of 
animate ftgures, the composition is plenty dynamic. An 1865 review in Watson's WeekbtArt 
Journal, in its praise of the painting, personiftes the landscape's features: 
We are brought face to face with Nature's living rocks. No composition work are 
they...Overhead in the clear air; free from the blue of the sky, float the clouds, a glad 
company, touched with the same golden glory. Between the lofty escarpments of 
rock flows the Yo Semite, its waters fondly repeating so much of the magnifIcence as 
they receive...The picture is full of ftne enthusiasm, of a free exultation in the grander 
24forms of nature.
23 Ibid., 87. 
24 Anonymous, Watsons Week!JArt Journal (May 20, 1865): 52. Quoted in appendix, ed. Nancy K. Anderson 
and Linda S. Ferber, Albert Bierstadt: Art and Enterprise, (Brooklyn: The Brooklyn Museum, 1990), 200. 
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For this reviewer, the rocks are alive, the clouds keep company, and the waters express a 
fondness for the landscape they reflect. Ifwe perceive the same sort of animate activity in 
the painting, we conclude that the viewer of Looking Down Yosemite Vaffry, and thus a 
vicarious traveler to the California wilderness, is invited to encounter a presence embodied 
not through human beings or their products, but rather through the most primal elements of 
the natural world: air, earth, water, and light. We might also conclude that Bierstadt 
intentionally invokes the sublime as it was understood and expressed within American art at 
the time. Unlike the Kantian "negative pleasure" that accompanies the phenomenal 
experience ofmagnitude and/or power that overwhelms the imagination, the transformed 
American sublime is decidedly more benign, and significandy, intersubjective. 
According to Cronon, this particular notion of the sublime was used to describe a felt 
encounter with God via an engagement with the natural world which, while having potential 
for terror, could also reassure the subject by granting her a sense of God's infinite grace.25 
And significandy, a sublime experience of this sort was regarded as extra-historical. Cronon 
writes of this particular experience of nature, "[s]een as the sacred sublime, it is the home of 
a God who transcends history by standing as the One who remains untouched and 
unchanged by time's arrow."Z6 
The distincdy sublime character of the painting, I suggest, is particularly apparent in 
the formal interplay between the light and the cliffs. Because the valley walls are mosdy 
darkened through the contrast of the sun shining direcdy behind it, one may interpret the 
most significant aspect of the painting as the rising sun; and conclude that the composition 
25 Cronan, 75. 
26 Ibid, 79. 
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intended to draw the viewer's gaze awqy from the cliffs, as if they do nothing but obscure the 
dazzling sunrise that is surely occurring around the bend. However, I argue that the sunrise 
is so dazzling to us because of its relation the formidably dark cliffwalls, and as such, we are 
encouraged to consider them in their formal interrelation. The light of the rising sun may 
appear more brilliant to us than it would were it not shining from behind these crags, and 
the sunlight in tum allows the viewer to better appreciate the size, form and contour of the 
cliffs themselves. Rather than barriers from the beauty of God's creation, we may see the 
cliff walls as gates leading into a sacred space, inviting us in while still evoking feelings of 
humility. The viewer may be left with a renewed respect for the authority of nature, but also 
a desire, or even entidement, to enjoy this hallowed space. 
My interpretation of this work, as offering a view of nature that authoritatively 
beckons the viewer into a sacred space, is also informed by the social conditions and cultural 
discourses prevalent at the time of its painting. We may confidendy assume based on the 
written accounts of Bierstadt's traveling companion, author Fitz Hugh Ludlow, that this 
magnificent scene was intended to evoke the idea of Eden. Ludlow writes that before their 
visit, both he and Bierstadt had heard rumors that Yosemite Valley was stunning enough to 
be considered the "original site of the Garden of Eden." 27 And when the pair finally visited 
the valley in 1863, they did not seem to disagree. Ludlow writes of a particularly panoramic 
view of the valley from a peak called Inspiration Point: 
The name had appeared pedantic, but we found it only the spontaneous expression 
of our own feelings on the spot. We did not so much seem to be seeing from that 
crag of vision a new scene on the old familiar globe, as a new heaven and a new earth 
27 Fitz Hugh Ludlow, The Heart ofthe Continent: A Record ofTravelAcross the Plains and in Oregon, with an 
Examination ofthe Mormon Principle (New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1870),412. Quoted in Nancy K. Anderson, 
"'Wonderously Full of Invention': The Western Landscapes ofAlbert Bierstadt," Albert Bierstadt: Art and 
Enterprise, ed. Nancy Anderson and Linda Ferber (Brooklyn: The Brooklyn Museum, 1990), 81. 
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into which the creative spirit had just been breathed. I hesitate now, as I did then, at 
the attempt to give my vision utterance. Never were words so beggard for an 
abridged translation of any Scripture of Nature.z8 
For Ludlow, the view ofYosemite Valley inspired because it appeared to him as an utterly 
new world. The dramatic features of the valley walls were perhaps unlike any he had seen 
before, and yet it bore an aesthetic logic suggestive of creative intelligence. Ludlow attributes 
his loss for words to his lack of a "translation" of the "Scripture of Nature," a claim that 
reinforces the idea that the scene before him was of deep intentional significance, issued 
forth by a divine, authoritative creator. One could interpret this quotation as indicating that 
Yosemite'Valley appeared to Ludlow as the first humans were imagined to have beheld the 
Garden of Eden: a brand-new space embodying the original, immediate visions of a divine 
creator, uncorrupted by human society or history. 
The association ofYosemite with the Garden of Eden was exemplary of a fairly 
common trope during the Westward expansion of the nineteenth century. Given that a 
majority ofwhite setders in the United States from the seventeenth century onward were 
Christian, and thus had adopted a historicity which placed humanity's birth in the blissful 
Garden of Eden, movement westward into "unsetded"z9 territory held overtones for many 
of a return to the original paradise. And since political and economic independence from 
Europe was still a priority for the new nation, the stark geographical differences between the 
young American democracy and the old European monarchies were reframed in moral 
28 Ludlow, 426. Quoted in Anderson, 81. 
29 When I refer to settlement in the West, I deliberately employ the deftnition of settlement as it was 
understood in the United States in the nineteenth century: namely, the establishment ofwhite American 
communities. Despite the fact that Native American communities had existed for millennia in nearly every 
comer of the continent, the United States government, disturbingly, did not recognize these communities as 
legitimate settlements, but rather saw them as obstacles to the project ofwhite settlement. 
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terms. Carolyn Merchant, in her book Reinventing Eden: The Fate ifNature in Western Culture, 
writes: 
As a place ofmoral purity, unblemished nature could restore humans who lived 
within its presence. This image of an untouched America contrasted sharply with 
that of a spoiled and corrupt Europe. The myth ofAmerica as an original, eternal 
Eden expressed the hope of returning to a past in which nature was pure and history 
unadulterated. Here the Edenic possibility of living within nature and outside of 
d 30history thr·lve. 
The imagined "unspoiled" character of American wilderness, it was believed, could "restore" 
the young immigrant society to an order closer to that of nature, which was imagined to 
express the original will of the Judeo-Christian creator. By founding a home in this 
"unadulterated space," moreover, the pioneer or immigrant could make a life for himself and 
his family that better reflected his own beliefs and values. Thus nature, imagined as a 
modern-day Eden, was for the American settler a site in which society and the individual 
could both be restored to their original, rightful states. And significantly, this restoration was 
characterized as liberation from history, because it effected a return to a realm of 
righteousness and happiness that only existed before mankind's "fall" from God's good 
graces. 
Actual life on the frontier, however, with its hostile encounters with Indians, disease, 
famine, and treacherous journeys across mountain ranges and deserts, was far from Edenic. 
Yet for those eastern city-dwellers who had not yet experienced the "Wild West" firsthand, 
the idea of the frontier was a source of great interest and hope. Bierstadt's gallery in New 
York City was an especially popular venue for Western enthusiasts in the 1860's and 70's. 
Not only were his massive, sensationalist paintings among the most well-known visual 
records of the West, but the gallery space itself, adorned with buffalo robes, feathers, arrows, 
30 Carolyn Merchant, Reinventing Eden: The Fate ifNature in Western Culture (London: Routledge, 2003), 102. 
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and other Indian artifacts, gave the illusion of a frontier trading post.31 And while Bierstadt 
himself did not maintain his artistic reputation after the 1870's, the mythologizing of the 
West among East coast and Midwest urbanites continued to intensify as it became clear that 
the frontier days were rapidly coming to a close. Moreover, the divisive and bloody Civil War 
of the 1860's sharply called into question the possibility that the American people could 
escape social unrest and return to a steadfast and harmonious order. In other words, 
knowledge of the quick and thorough settlement of the West and the experience of the 
conflicts of the Civil War jeopardized the widespread belief that America could offer an 
Edenic restoration of human life. 
The art world responded to this concern with a proliferation of peaceful natural 
scenes. Art historian Nancy K. Anderson writes, ''When the Civil War broke out, blood 
spilled in Eden. The landscape Americans had used to defIne themselves was irretrievably 
changed. Many American landscape painters countered this sober reality with images of 
nature at peace.,,32 Bierstadt was no exception to this trend; according to Anderson, the artist 
traveled through several battlegrounds on his way to Yosemite, and yet nothing indicative of 
war appears in his paintings.33 Given the formal elements of this painting, combined with the 
Edenic implications of the American West and public distress over the Civil War, I would 
like to suggest that Looking Down Yosemite Vallry is an example of a utopian mirror through 
which nineteenth century Americans could defme themselves, their society and their values. 
By way of contrast, this sublime, spacious and inviting scene may have helped viewers give 
31 Anderson, 73. 
32 Ibid., 81. 
33 Ibid., 80. 
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concrete vision to what they found to be wrong with their society; namely, human 
corruption through setdement and conflict. This utopian image helped to articulate the 
resistant values that its viewers likely identified with, such as purity, peace, and the authority 
of God. 
The sharp decline of Bierstadt's career in the 1870's coincided with the rise in cross-
country rail travel. The ease with which eastern urbanites could see the West for themselves 
largely obviated the need for cosdy larger-than-life landscape paintings. And as more people 
did visit places such as Yosemite, it became clear that Bierstadt manipulated the features of 
his landscape paintings for dramatic effect, and to such a degree that they bore litde 
resemblance to the actual sites. Clarence King, head of the United States Geological 
Exploration of the Fortieth Parallel, publicly criticized Bierstadt's Yosemite paintings for 
their lack of accuracy in 1872: 
What has he done but twist and skew and distort and discolor and belitde and be­
pretty this whole doggoned country? Why, his mountains are too high and too slim; 
they'd blow over in our of our fall winds. I've herded colts two summers in 
Yosemite, and honest now, when I stood right up in front of his picture, I didn't 
know it.34 
I would like to suggest that the story of Bierstadt's astronomic rise and fall illustrates both a 
significant tension in the ways that many Americans related to more-than-human nature 
during the mid-to-Iate nineteenth century, as well as the role of art in facilitating the 
development of this tension. Bierstadt's paintings resonated with his audience because it 
expressed utopian values such as harmony and purity that were unrealized in a period 
characterized by war and extensive human setdement. These values, it is possible to infer, 
were imagined to be experienceable as expressions of the will of a divine creative authority 
34 Clarence King, Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970),207. Quoted 
in Ferber, 48. 
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through the hannonious yet dramatic interplay among landscape features. We can thus view 
Bierstadt's Looking Down Yosemite Vallry as reinforcing the injunction of the American 
sublime to encounter divinity by aesthetically appreciating nature. However, as it became 
increasingly clear that Bierstadt himself did not accurately depict the geological features of 
the Yosemite valley, those who had visited the site, such as Clarence King, could denounce 
his work as "distorting, discoloring, and belittling" American nature. In other words, 
Bierstadt's painting promotes the idea, common in nineteenth-century discourses on nature 
aesthetics, that there is a divine, authoritative "other" that addresses us in nature, but upon 
further examinations it appears that the representation of this other was distorted by his 
conformity to established artistic techniques and compositional strategies. 
"New": A Utopian Vision for the Alienated I 
This consideration of Bierstadt's work may be highly infonnative for the study of the 
aesthetic experience of nature in our own time. Not only do landscape images similar to that 
of Looking Down Yosemite Vallry commonly appear in visual culture today, I believe that they 
are wrought with similar tensions. I would like to focus my discussion on a contemporary 
image so ubiquitous and so mundane, that it may not even seem to be worthy of 
consideration as an aesthetic object. 
New (fig. 2) is an anonymous photograph that the reader may recognize as a default 
desktop background option for Vista, the most recent version ofMicrosoft Windows. The 
depicted scene bears many fonnal qualities similar to that of Bierstadt's painting. The cahn 
waters of the lake, dominating the foreground of the scene, reflect nearly perfectly the cloud­
dotted blue sky and the mountains in the background. Along the bank is a dense patch of 
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Figure 2. Anonymous, New, 2006. Photograph, background image for Microsoft Windows' 
Vista interface. 
evergreen trees, and towering overhead stands a single mountain, partially illuminated by the 
sun, but with its peak dramatically darkened in shadow. In the far background we see the 
continuation of the mountain range, but the eye is led upward into the sky, where clouds 
appear to have directionality, seemingly moving toward (or away from) a bright spot on the 
horizon behind the mountain. 
Not only do many of the natural features in Bierstadt's Yosemite appear in New 
(namely: mountains, reflective waters, lack of human presence, and dramatic sunlight), but 
the aesthetic effect is also similar. The stark sunlight and the central placement of the 
shadowed peak, two of the most dominant features of the image, are associated with the 
more standard iconography of the sublime. Yet like Bierstadt's painting, this sublime image 
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is not terrifyingly so: the placid waters and blue skies transform the scene into one of quiet 
grandeur, and the viewer may feel as though she is seduced into the photograph by the 
directionality of the clouds. 
It may be argued that this image appears to us in too mundane of a context to merit 
discussion of its aesthetic effect, and as such, it is not appropriate to compare it with an epic 
landscape painting of the nineteenth century. However, the formal similarities between the 
two images, as I have already suggested, are unmistakable. It shows there to be some 
continuity in the way we choose to represent nature to ourselves. Dramatic land features, 
tranquil weather conditions and significantly, a lack of visible human presence all make for 
appealing nature scenes to us. Moreover, I suggest that these features evoke similar values 
for us as they did in Bierstadt's time. We may not think specifically of Eden when we 
consider New, yet given its name, it seems as though we associate these formal qualities with 
rejuvenation and renewal. The craggy landscape bears no evidence of human settlement, nor 
does it seem to be amenable to it. The remarkable stillness of the water also indicates a lack 
of activities such as boating or swimming. Yet it is precisely this which makes it so appealing: 
we want to enter those waters, explore that forest, hike that mountain; it evokes a sort of 
quietude and spaciousness that is not normally found in everyday human life. And while our 
desire for this sort of rejuvenating encounter with nature is not mediated by the Civil War 
and fascination with frontier settlement, I suggest the appeal of images such as these is 
informed by the alienation that many today experience in their working lives today. 
New and other inspiring images of nature are not uncommon to computer desktop 
backgrounds. Often the background is chosen by a computer user either because of its 
pleasing, calming effect on the eye (making it a nice contrast to tedium and stress associated 
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with work-related documents), or because it gives a personal touch to the appearance of the 
computer itself. While I myself do not choose New as my own desktop background, I do 
have an image by the painter Friedensreich Hundertwasser which I chose both because of its 
bold and lively color scheme and, more significantly, because Hundertwasser is my favorite 
painter. The tasks that dominate my use of the computer, such as computing grades and 
paying bills, are necessary for my job and the maintenance ofmy home, but I do not identijj 
with these tasks. Others find themselves tied to even more banal computational tasks such as 
accounting or data entry which are neither intrinsically enjoyable or for the immediate self­
benefit. The desktop background is a minor and relatively mundane venue through which 
one may reap some personal enjoyment from of their workday and to reclaim some of their 
individuality. 
Ifwe return to Buber's discussion of the problematic relational schism between the 
outer "It-district" of institutions and the inner "I-district" of feelings, we may interpret the 
individualized desktop background as a small refuge for the inner "I" within the institutional 
realm. I have already cited Buber's argument that when the self severs her identity between 
an "outer" world ofwork and an "inner" world of feelings, in neither situation is she able to 
engage the world with her whole being. How, then does inclusion of the personalized 
desktop image of nature into the individual's workday affect her capacity for relation? Can it 
rejoin the two alienated aspects of herself? 
I suggest that the inclusion of this desktop image in fact reinforces the division 
between the "I-district" and the "It-district," despite the fact that they exist in the same 
space. Although the drama of the sunlight, the severity of the mountain peak, calmness of 
the waters and overall spaciousness of the scene depicted in New are brought into the 
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individual's perceptual field during her workday, these elements only highlight the 
contrasting features of her lived experience, such as the glare of artificial lighting, the 
stuffiness of the indoor air, and the crowded, confined workspaces. Thus, in line with my 
discussion of the utopian character of aesthetic objects, the choice ofNew as a desktop 
background may be read as a protest, however slight, of the banal, confining and alienating 
aspects of working life. 
False Utopia and the Hidden Production of Irresponsibility 
Utopia aside, if the display of an uplifting image such as New were to help repair the' 
schism between institutional and inner life, we would see, according to Buber, a radical 
transformation of the individual's relational attitude in her workday. Not only would she 
engage her work and her colleagues in a more enriching, holistic manner (a discussion of 
what this would look like is best left as the subject of another paper), but her relationship 
with nature would be likewise transformed. However ifwe recall Cronon's observation that 
our love of and identification with "pure" wilderness allows us to overlook the areas of our 
lives in which we act irresponsibly toward nature, we see that the aesthetic pleasure that an 
image like New brings to the workday similarly helps to condone environmental injustices 
accomplished on our watch. The image of a serene natural space free of human interference 
acts as a visual reassurance that there still are places uncorrupted by our presence, which in 
turn permits us ignore the toll that the material conditions of our working life are taking on 
our earth, such as the extraction of minerals, oil, and tree fiber to build our offices and 
supplies, and the expending of energy to heat and light them. 
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I would like to suggest, moreover, that our brief aesthetic "escapes" into and 
identification with these uplifting nature scenes not only allow us to condone our complicity 
with our irresponsible exploitation of natural resources, but they may even be the fuel for its 
perpetuation. To explain this point, I turn to Adorno and Max Horkheimer's essay "The 
Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception" a powerful and oft-cited critique of 
twentieth-century consumer culture. In this essay, the two authors meditate on the idea that 
capitalism's influence on culture has reached a point whereby the ubiquity of advertising and 
commodity fetishism has all but obliterated the possibility of genuinely individual taste or 
critical thought. And as a result, they suggest that even our modes of resistance to the social, 
cultural, and economic status quo are mediated by the "culture industry" in a way that 
reproduces the very conditions deemed intolerable. They effectively summarize this 
particular idea with a metaphor of a foiled elopement: 
The flight from the everyday world, promised by the culture industry in all its 
branches, is much like the abduction of the daughter in the American cartoon: the 
father is holding the ladder in the dark. The culture industry presents that same 
everyday world as paradise. Escape, like elopement, is destined from the first to lead 
back to its starting point. Entertainment fosters the resignation which seeks to forget 
itself in entertainment.35 
Adorno and Horkheimer use the metaphorical image of a father preventing his daughter 
from elopement: the ladder to the daughter's desired liberation is provided and held by her 
father, the very person she believes to be escaping. The means of her flight will lead her 
squarely back into the arms of he who she wishes to flee. Similarly, according to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, the products and activities that promise a flight from the everyday world are 
situated in such a way that they reinforce the perpetuation of the everyday. 
35 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," Dialectic 
oJEnlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 113. 
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The enjoyment derived from the nature scene on the computer desktop may 
rejuvenate the individual worker to the point that her day is more productive, and her 
institutional contributions and commitments thus improve in quantity and quality. When she 
is fmally granted a vacation, moreover, she may choose to spend her precious leisure time by 
visiting a natural space that she finds to be aesthetically inspiring. However, even in this 
actual, physical "escape" from her institutional commitments, she still fmds herself 
contributing to their perpetuation. The purchase of the fuel which takes her to her 
destination, for example and the gear with which she engages nature (such as tents, maps, 
and shoes) reveal her hidden entrapment within institutional life even in her excursion "out" 
of society and into the more-than-human world. It is as Adorno and Horkheimer argue, 
"The standardized forms, it is claimed, were originally derived from the needs of the 
consumers: that is why they are accepted with so litde resistance. In reality, a cycle of 
manipulation and retroactive need is unifying the system ever more tighdy."36 In other 
words, the production of a desire and its superficial, ultimately false fulfillment only 
strengthens the power and the reach of the culture industry. 
Thus we can understand the desire to flee toward an extra-historical nature, as it is 
expressed in a contemporary commodity-driven society, to be something that is 
simultaneously encouraged and thwarted within the social and economic realm. Adorno and 
Horkheimer confu:m as much when they direcdy address the status of nature within the 
culture industry: 
Nature, in being presented by society's control mechanism as the healing antithesis 
of society, is itself absorbed into that incurable society and sold off. The solemn 
pictorial affirmation that the trees are green, the sky is blue and the clouds are sailing 
overhead already makes them pictograms for factory chimneys and gasoline stations. 
36 Ibid., 95. 
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Conversely, wheels and machine parts are made to gleam expressively, debased as 
receptacles of that leafy, cloudy soul. In this way both nature and technology are 
mobilized against the alleged stuffIness, the faked recollection of liberal society...37 
According to Adorno and Horkheimer, nature and our concepts of it are thoroughly 
entrenched in systems of commodifIcation, and interestingly, this transformation is largely 
aesthetic. Visual elements of nature in its most pleasing expressions (such as a blue sky or a 
leafy, green tree) are reproduced on and within cultural products themselves. And on the 
other hand, commodities are advertised as embodying, or at least assisting in the attainment 
of nature's palliative qualities. There are countless examples of this phenomenon in 
contemporary advertising, such the near-ubiquitous television commercial for a brand new 
automobile with a car zipping down a lonely highway against the backdrop of a stunning 
coastline, forest, or mountain landscape. Thus the aesthetic motifs that we associate with 
nature not only secretly guide us into supporting the institutional life that we think we are 
resisting, they are also explicitly used to promote commodities. According to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, we are duped into believing that our utopian visions can and will be realized by 
our institutional life by invoking the imagery that we associate with its rejection. 
We have come to a point in this essay where we fInd our utopian attraction to a 
prehistoric nature uncorrupted by human presence, and our heterotopian experience of 
nature as a restorative escape from the falsity of our society, actually strengthens and 
reinforces the conditions that we believe to be protesting. This thought is troubling, for 
although we know that a utopian vision is informed by the particular conditions of a society 
that we fInd to be intolerable, we also believe that alignment with these utopian values will 
guide us in the creation of a new and better order. The shock that comes with this 
37 Ibid., 119. 
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realization, I suggest, is similar to that felt by the nineteenth-century American art world, 
when, after travel to the West was facilitated by railroads, it was revealed that Bierstadt had 
been unfaithful to the sacred sublimity of nature in his popular, sensationalist paintings. As 
they were increasingly able to visit the sites themselves, Bierstadt's adoring public denounced 
the false character of his particular articulation of utopia. We must now ask ourselves how 
we today can remain true to the utopian values that resist both the alienation of human labor 
within our institutions, and the exploitation and destruction of the earth facilitated by our 
unconscious complicity with institutional life. 
Reclaiming Utopia through Aesthetics of Negation 
Rather than ftnding fault in the utopian vision itself, I suggest that what we need is 
an attitudinal shift that would allow us to act more faithfully toward the realization of its 
values. Adorno, in his Aesthetic Theory, indicates what this might look like. In a chapter tided 
"Situation," he discusses the association of modern art with the promise of "newness." If an 
artist introduces a technique or motif that has not been seen before in the history of its 
medium, Adorno suggests that the subject's experience of this new element resonates with 
her desire for a change in her lived situation. Yet the most effective expression of a utopian 
desire in art for Adorno is the articulation of the collapse of the protested conditions. He 
elaborates: 
A cryptogram of the new is the image of collapse; only by virtue of the absolute 
negativity of collapse does art enunciate the unspeakable: utopia. In this image of 
collapse all the stigmata of the repulsive and loathsome in modem art gather. 
Through the irreconcilable renunciation of the semblance of reconciliation, art holds 
fast to the promise of reconciliation in the midst of the reconciled: This is the true 
consciousness of an age in which the real possibility of utopia-that given the level 
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of productive forces the earth could here and now be paradise-converges with the 
possibility of total catastrophe.38 
This passage can be read as an apology for the "repulsive and loathsome" characteristics of 
some avant-garde art that resist evaluation as beautiful, harmonious, pleasurable or otherwise 
unified by aesthetic logic. Through their adamant lack of aesthetic reconciliation, Adorno 
suggest that these uncomfortable works of art reflect back to its audience their own desire 
for a reconciled world. In this way, the works that negate or "collapse" the utopian 
expressions ordinarily found in art are in fact more faithful to the positive expressions of 
utopia found in more agreeable aesthetic objects. Echoing his concerns about the culture 
industry's production of false conditions for escape, Adorno suggests that the aesthetic 
attitude cultivated by these negating works of art allow us to see that the positive articulation 
of utopian values is concurrent with the catastrophic consequences of that utopia's failure. 
Using the concept of uncorrupted nature as an example, this last claim becomes clear when 
we recall the damage done to the environment that is simultaneously concealed and 
perpetuated by the production of this false utopian image of nature. 
While Adorno addresses the capacity that different kinds of art have for expressing 
utopian values, I am more specifically concerned with the aesthetic attitude associated with 
the vision of negation or collapse. And so rather than suggest that we create or seek out 
aesthetic representations of nature that more closely express the negative moment favored 
by Adorno, I would like to immanendy consider what sort of meanings a negatively utopian 
engagement with our desktop image would reveal for us. As a starting point for this 
38 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. and trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997), 32-33. 
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particular question, I fInd it helpful to refer to an essay by]ennifer Price in which she 
considers the representation of nature within a shopping mall. 
Price's essay "Looking for Nature at the Mall: A Field Guide to the Nature 
Company" is a sustained study into a shopping experience that mimics the supposed 
transformative encounter with "pure" nature. A California-based chain store frequently 
found in shopping malls across the country in the 1990's, the Nature Company was an 
eclectic gift store that offered items as diverse as educational books, science project kits, 
clothing, music, toys, gardening supplies and home decor, all of which were intended to 
foster knowledge and appreciation of the natural world. Price argues that methodologically, a 
study of a space such as the Nature Company, rather than "nature" itself, enables us to see 
more clearly the cultural origin of values that shape our conception of nature. She writes, 
Ordinarily, if you buy pruning shears at the hardware store, or your bird guide at a 
bookstore, these convictions don't face any serious threat...But here, where the 
Nature Company has brought together thousands of nature-oriented products, the 
boundaries we've draw a around 'nature' begin to look visible. If you compile the 
complete pool of meanings, and stack and shelve them all together in one room in a 
mall, they begin to look like meanings.39 
In other words, the production and display of a commodity require the producer and 
vendor, each in their own ways, to communicate as clearly and compellingly as possible what 
meanings the consumer should ideally associate with a product. Through this dissemination 
of meaning through advertising, packaging design, and arrangement alongside other, 
similarly marketed products, we are confronted by our values on a material, experiential 
level, and are thus better able to evaluate their contributions to our seemingly prereflective 
conceptions of the world. 
39 Jennifer Price, "Looking for Nature at the Mall: A Field Guide to the Nature Company," Uncommon Ground: 
Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1996), 190. 
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Within the Nature Company storefront, Price argues that diverse natural spaces are 
experientially collapsed into the space of the shop itself, undergirding the vast conceptual 
and physical distance between actual spaces of "pure" nature, and ordinary social space. 
Price writes, 
We are globe-coasters all, and the natural world has remained near center stage 
during the late-twentieth-century postmodern collapse of space. The Nature 
Company invites us to touch every part of the globe. And you can browse the earth's 
wild things close to home, because the company has installed similar assemblages in 
malls (nationwide) ...4o 
By offering picture books of the Amazon rainforest, field guides to North American birds, 
fossil casts from Mongolian deserts, and plush simulacra ofAfrican savannah wildlife, the 
Nature Company effectively truncates the particular aspects of diverse natural spaces into a 
more universal concept of "Nature" as remote spaces free of or protected from human 
impact. The commodified representations of said nature are appealing, for they supposedly 
allow the consumer to bring into her life something of the encounter of "Nature" without 
undergoing the difficulties that an actual journey into natural space may entail. 
For the sake of brevity and for the benefit of specificity, I would like to focus on a 
particular example within Price's study that will be informative of our discussion thus: a CD 
titled Glacier Bqy, featuring the calls ofArctic humpback whales. Given that whales are not 
human and are thus viewed as wholly outside the influence of culture, their "songs," when 
regarded as such, are marketed as having a sort of ontological authority over human music, 
and is thus framed as a primal Dr-music that all persons, regardless of cultural association, 
should be able to appreciate universally. 
40 Ibid, 193. 
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Price, however, argues that the way in which whale songs are packaged and marketed 
reveals that the appeal of this music is far from universal, since it stems from a need to relax 
and restore oneself at the end of the tiring, alienating workday. "The call of the humpack 
whale," she writes, "promotes human peace ofmind. The arctic landscape and its animals 
become shadowy realities, subordinate to those meanings."41 The Arctic whale songs, 
reinterpreted and transformed into compact disc available for easy purchase within a 
shopping mall, can thus be revealed as primarily appealing to by consumers hoping to ftnd 
"peace of mind;" the fact that the songs are by whales is of a secondary importance. We can 
see in the appeal of this CD a desire the escape the responsibilities and felt alienation of the 
social, institutional world by a sonic immersion in more-than-human nature. However, the 
CD itself, like the desire it promises to satiate, is wholly produced and marketed within the 
society the consumers want to flee. Like the girl, whose father is holding her escape ladder, 
the consumer is simultaneously seduced by and prevented from fulftllment of the promise of 
an a-cultural, pre-historic nature, all ofwhich, signiftcandy, within a decidedly aesthetic 
framework. 
Price's analysis of the whale song CD brings us to the same dilemma that we faced in 
our consideration of Bierstadt's painting and the Microsoft Windows desktop background. 
Not only are our images and desired experiences of nature actually products of our cultural 
frustration with our social world, but they are also disseminated in such a way that 
perpetuates those self-same problems we would like to escape, and thus does not allow us to 
encounter the otherness of nature that we seek. This analysis seems to conftrm that our 
growing intuition that a restorative pre-historic nature, "pure" of human influence, simply 
41 Ibid., 194. 
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does not exist. After reaching this point in her own essay, however, Price makes a move that 
I liken to Adorno's proposed aesthetic attitude of utopian negativity. In order to give vision 
to our utopian identification with a world free of alienation and human corruption, we must 
also look past the socially disseminated, positive utopian concept of pure nature. When we 
do this, we are not left with nothing, but rather, as Price suggests, we are newly confronted 
by the materiality of culturally-derived "natural" products, no longer concealed by the false 
concepts that went into their production. She writes: 
Every "nature-oriented" item, whether recycled or not, is literally manufactured from 
nature. When I "consume" an inflatable penguin, I'm literally consuming natural 
resources like oil, wood, minerals, and energy. Who thinks about that? Who thinks of 
the Glacier Bqy whale calls as <petroleum' more than 'freedom'? Looking for what 
nature means, we can lose track of nature itself-but doubly ironic, if the real arctic 
landscape recedes as we graft abstract meanings onto it, its oil might be right in our 
laps.42 
Price's call to consider the physical composition of the compact disc itself encourages the 
reader to confront the material facticity of nature. For reasons already discussed, the CD 
may fail to fulfill the consumer's desire to escape society and be restored in nature, but it 
may literally, tangibly provide the consumer with a portion of the petroleum extracted from 
the same region in which these whales sang. The grim reports of global warming and the 
wars over oil which dominate news headlines today ought to reaffirm Price's 
acknowledgement of material nature within the cultural product. The nature that we set aside 
as "pure," pre-historical and restorative of human life bears the wounds of humanity's 
demand for (and misuse of) land and material resources, and as such, cannot be considered 
to be outside the confines of human life and responsibility. 
42 Price, 199. 
47 
The negation of the false utopian promise within our concept of nature opens us to 
the possibility of being confronted by nature in the very materiality of our civilized world. 
Rather than allowing discrete, alienated aspects of ourselves to encounter specifically chosen 
natural spaces when we feel the need to be restored and renewed, we are now able to 
recognize that spaces and objects ordinarily considered "human" and cultural have a material 
existence and significance born from the more-than-human world. And because nature is 
confronting us in spaces in which we primarily engage the world with our institutional selves, 
our usually alienated "I-hood" is brought back into our more explicitly social spheres of 
relation. We are thus closer to recognizing nature in its whole being, and at the same time, we 
are closer to engaging nature with our whole being. Ifwe bring this insight back to the 
discussion of the desktop background, an aesthetic attitude of utopian negativity would resist 
the impulse to see the scene of "pure" nature as a refuge from the institutional world within 
the workday. She would instead more readily perceive the materials that went into the 
construction of her computer as continuous with the trees, mountains and water depicted in 
New, and her own institutional activities as implicated in the fate of the depicted natural 
space. 
Thus I would like to suggest that this shift in aesthetic attitude allows the social 
subject, who desires a restorative engagement with an a-cultural, extra-historical other, an 
opportunity to engage this other in a way that Buber would liken a genuine I-You encounter, 
which, in contrast to the I-It experience, fosters meaning and ethical responsibility. Instead 
of looking for an ultimately false, self-gratifying venue for escape within nature, we can strive 
to halt or transform our destructive behavior toward nature through our recognition of the 
altered and exploited materiality of nature in our midst. We may become more mindful of 
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the resources we consume, and we may find ways to reframe nature as having a history 
continuous with our own, a history to which we are responsible. 
Conclusion: Nature's Otherness within Us 
By collapsing the false distinction between our imagined pre-historic home in nature 
and our actually lived, historically situated home in culture, it may be said that we are 
reframing humanity as continuous with rather than opposed to nature. Yet interestingly, at 
the same time, we are also reafftrming the need to orient ourselves toward otherness in 
nature at all points in our lives. The simultaneous identification with and respect for the 
otherness in nature appears to be another expression of the tension between identity and 
difference that we found in our original, utopian image of pre-historic nature. However, 
rather than stemming from the actions and beliefs of an institutionally-embedded "I" 
alienated from its inner life, the encounter with nature described here is one in which the 
wholeness of both nature and the self are affIrmed. 
Near the end of his "Nature" essay, Emerson articulates something of how it might 
be still be possible to regard humanity as both continuous with and other than nature, after 
one is able to fundamentally and holistically reframe her relationship with nature. He writes, 
"Nature sends no creature, no man into the world without adding a small excess of his 
proper quality."43 I take this to mean that in their struggles to survive and reproduce, 
creatures of the natural world exhibit an impulse toward a higher existence that can never be 
achieved, and that the human is no exception. However, because of this impulse to reach 
above and outside oneself, life persists, and the natural world as we know it continues to 
43 Emerson, 303. 
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grow and thrive. Our desire to better ourselves through our encounters with the natural 
world and the struggles we undergo to be worthy of its perceived authority, are itself 
indicative of our natural excess, and ultimately where we fmd our own worth. For Emerson, 
"We aim above the mark, to hit the mark,"44 and along those lines, I suggest that the very act 
of articulating a utopian image through art is one of the ways in which we aim above the 
mark. He says as much about art when he claims, "Our music, our poetry, our language itself 
are not satisfactions, but suggestions."45 Ifwe regard art, as I have done in this essay, as a 
venue for the expression of and identification with utopian values that resist intolerable 
social conditions, we can read Emerson as calling on us to rigorously take up in our own lives 
the values suggested to us in aesthetic objects, rather than expect them to satisfy our desires 
in themselves. 
I thus conclude that the only way for us to encounter the otherness we hope to fmd 
in nature is to embrace what Emerson would call our natural ability to attune ourselves to 
what is beyond ourselves. This desire for change by way of new, meaningful engagements 
with the world is not only what Emerson identifies with nature, but it is also that which 
inspires us to explore the limits of our meaningful world through art, and it is that which 
ensures our continued historical growth. Nature, as implicated in our own history, is thus not 
the site of pre-historic origin that we initially posited it to be. Yet we have seen that our 
desire to encounter nature as an origin has revealed significant obstacles to our cultivation of 
a genuinely responsible relationship with the more-than-human world, and it has also 
revealed how reframing our aesthetic engagement with nature can help us overcome these 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 304. 
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obstacles and ultimately achieve a more responsible coexistence. Because the particular 
relationship with otherness articulated here was shown to be of central concern in this 
chapter, I would like to begin my next chapter by examining the supposed origins of this 
aspect of human consciousness. What do we know of the early human's engagement with 
more-than-human otherness, and what material evidence do we have to support our ideas? 
How should we relate to an origin that gives central importance to human relationality itself? 
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CHAPTER III
 
PRIMAL ENCOUNTERS: A MODERN HISTORY OF LASCAUX
 
Introduction 
I have just examined experiences that inform the concept of a pre-historic origin in 
nature, and the aesthetic objects that affIrm or sediment those experiences. As I suggested, 
the belief in nature as prior to and thus free from the historical corruption of humans is itself 
an expression of the subject's dissatisfaction with her social existence and her desire to 
identify with society's "other." Yet, while this particular notion of a pre-historic origin in 
nature probably reveals more about present social conditions than nature itself, we also 
found that reframing our problematic relationship with nature could address some of the key 
problems that motivate our desire to experience a particular kind of nature: namely, social 
alienation and environmental destruction. A more responsible engagement with nature 
would allow us recognize its otherness from us, but following Emerson, it would also 
acknowledge that our desire and ability to encounter otherness comes from our participation 
in nature's history. 
Therefore, if we wish to continue to gain insight into our origins, I suggest that we 
reframe our search in order to critically examine our capacity for relation. In other words, 
perhaps we would better understand human nature if we knew how our earliest ancestors 
perceived themselves in relation to the more-than-human world. Unfortunately, scholars 
have very little evidence with which to support their speculations on early human 
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consciousness or culture. Drawings and paintings, however, do survive from the earliest days 
of our species homo sapiens sapiens, and are thus treated by some as a unique window into the 
life and mind of the ancient human. In this chapter, I intend to focus on one such example 
of prehistoric art, which also happens to be the best known and most revered in Western 
circles: the colored cave paintings at Lascaux in southern France. 
I will begin by suggesting, drawing on Georges Bataille, that the lushly detailed, 
vividly colored paintings of animals covering Lascaux's walls simultaneously express the early 
human's otherness from and relation to the more-than-human world. Moreover, because the 
creation of Lascaux and other prehistoric art coincides with the emergence of our species, 
the tension between otherness and relation is understood by some scholars as signifying a 
key moment of transition away from animality and toward a distinctly human consciousness. 
In other words, this relational tension is re&amed by some as evidence of our species' birth. 
Understanding Lascaux as visual evidence of humanity in its infancy, I suggest, predisposes 
some to consider the cave as offering insight into humankind's present condition. 
However, as my discussion will show, attempts to establish a meaningful relation 
between ourselves and our earliest human ancestors are hindered both by the present-day 
scholar's ultimate ignorance of Paleolithic culture, as well as institutional forces that mediate 
our encounters with this kind of art. Thus the aim of my discussion will be to articulate 
through immanent critique the preconditions for an engagement with primal art in a way 
that bestows meaning and insight onto our lives today while still respecting our radical 
temporal and cultural distance from these works. The relational tension that I suggest we 
strive to maintain in our regard of Lascaux is, moreover, the same kind of tension between 
humanity and animality that is attributed to the paintings themselves. Ifwe are able to 
53 
cultivate this particular epistemic and aesthetic comportment toward Lascaux, I conclude 
that we achieve a state of wonder that brings new and original meaning into our lives. 
Lascaux: Away from Animality 
Dated at approximately 15,000 B.CE., otherwise known as the "Magdalenian" 
period of early European civilization, the painted cave of Lascaux, along the Vezere River in 
the Dordogne region of southern France, is considered to be one of the more significant art 
historical discoveries of the century. Unlike most other Paleolithic cave art in the region, the 
paintings at Lascaux, mosdy depicting aurochs (prehistoric oxen), bison, stags and horses, 
were almost perfecdy preserved at the time of their discovery due to unique geological 
conditions that essentially rendered the interior of the cave waterproof.46 In September of 
1940, as the popular story goes, four teenage boys stumbled into the small, hidden entrance 
to the cave while chasing a dog. Upon exploring this cave, the boys were shocked to find at 
least two large chambers covered in color paintings of prehistoric animals.47 Although the 
cave was not officially opened to the public until 1948, its discovery was widely publicized as 
one of the more significant moments in the study of Paleolithic humans and art history. 
The art of Lascaux is neither the oldest in the region, nor is it the first to be 
discovered by modern humans. Yet it holds a special place in European Paleolithic art 
history because of the remarkably pristine conditions in which its paintings were found, the 
use of colored pigments, and evidence of a deliberate and sophisticated compositional logic. 
Most other caves in the Dordogne region are textured with stalactites, stalagmites, and 
46 Brigitte Delluc and Gilles Delluc, Discovering Lascaux, trans. Angela Caldwell (Lucan, France: Editions 
SudOuest, 2006), 15. 
47 Ibid. 
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calcite flows, which limit the smooth surfaces available for drawing or painting. As a result, 
these other decorated caves contain predominantly monochromatic engravings. If ancient 
humans were to have drawn or painted in these other spaces, however, the aforementioned 
geological features would have caused the pigments to peel off or be covered over in time. 
By contrast, the main chambers of Lascaux are covered in an even layer of calcite, providing 
a white, smooth surface that allowed for the easy application of pigments and vivid display 
of color.48 Moreover, scholars have noted that the cave walls are decorated in a way that 
suggest intentional composition; that is, certain animals are sized and arranged in proportion 
to the dimensions and structure of the cave itself. For example, different chambers within 
the cave predominantly depict different sets of animals. The largest of these areas, the "Bulls' 
Chamber," also contains some of the largest paintings, and the bulls depicted in this space 
are arranged somewhat symmetrically: similarly sized and shaped animals appear directly 
opposite one another on each wall.49 
Thus, Lascaux, I suggest, is the best known and most significant of the decorated 
caves in southern France due to its remarkable alignment with artistic conventions similar to 
our own. Because of the unique atmospheric and geologic conditions that preserved the 
paintings for nearly 17,000 years, the depicted animals appear to us as discrete and coherent 
whole images. The whiteness of the painted surface mirrors the modem painter's preference 
for white canvas or paper. And the apparently deliberate employment of compositional logic 
allows scholars and visitors alike to view and interpret the space as a total design, springing 
from creative, conscious minds much like our own. As a result, scholars seem to point to 
48Jbid., 19. 
49 Ibid., 59. 
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Lascaux more than any other decorated cave as a source of insight into our own identity as 
self-conscious, cultural beings. 
One such scholar, Georges Bataille argues that the practice of painting in Lascaux 
was itself the means by which humans emerged out of animality, but that doing so allowed 
them to establish a deeply respectful relationship with animals. However, this theory 
depends largely on an archaeological theory predominant at the time of its discovery. In a 
lecture titled "A Visit to Lascaux," Bataille draws on the work of archaeologist Raymond 
Lantier to argue that the painting was a sacred invocation of the animals that the 
Magdalenians hoped to successfully hunt.50 The very act of representation, still new to 
humans, was likely to have had an intense and powerful effect on the early human psyche. 
Here, Bataille describes the hypothetical experience of these acts of painting: 
Now let's imagine before the hunt, on which life and death will depend, the ritual: an 
attentively executed drawing, extraordinarily true to life, though seen in the light of 
the lamps, completed in a short time, the ritual, the drawing that provokes the 
apparition of this bison. This sudden creation had to have produced in the 
impassioned minds of the hunters an intense feeling of the proximity of the 
inaccessible monster, a feeling of proximity, of profound harmony... As if men, 
obscurely and suddenly, had the power to make the animal, though essentially out of 
range, respond to the extreme intensity of their desire.51 
The hunt of large game, which, if unsuccessful, could threaten the survival of the 
community, was sure to have been an emotionally charged, highly significant event. The 
success of the hunt depended in large part on animals that could easily evade, outrun or 
overpower the hunters. Thus for Bataille, the very fact that humans were able to render the 
bison present through the application of pigment to a cave wall was highly empowering, and 
50 Georges Bataille, "A Visit to Lascaux," The Cradle ifHumaniry: PrehistoricArt and Culture, ed. Stuart Kendall, 
trans. Michelle and Stuart Kendall, (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 49-50. 
51 Ibid., 51. 
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granted an opportunity to relate to the "inaccessible monster" upon whom they depended for 
survivaL In other words, the painting would render the animal less monstrous. 
According to Bataille, the especially vivid and detailed representations of animals at 
Lascaux are testament to the early hunters' deep respect, or even love for their prey. Not 
simply insurance for a successful hunt, Bataille argues that the paintings were a means by 
which humans could ask their prey for forgiveness. As evidence, he points to recreational 
hunting today, and argues that its continued popularity stems from this same sort of respect 
for the sovereignty of the wild animaL Bataille direcdy addresses the hunters in his audience: 
First, I will ask you if the moment the animal is seen is not a capital moment in the 
game of the hunt, a passionate moment, a moment that even has-it goes without 
saying, insofar as it is not necessary to immediately respond with an action, with 
gunfIre-something that constrains, that catches the breath. Next I will ask you an 
even stranger question. I will ask you if you have a slight hostility toward your prey. 
It seems that you don't. There is hostility in war, but I believe that in the hunt, the 
hunter never hates the animal he kills.52 
For Bataille, the prehistoric humans loved the animals they had to kill for their survival; and 
suggests that the modem-day hunter's experience of something that "catches the breath" 
when in the presence of their game expresses the continued possibility of love for the 
animal. 
Yet this love was not born from a sense of kinship. Bataille argues that humans were 
aware of a fundamental difference between themselves and other animals, and yet their 
desire to relate to them is apparent to those who study the paintings today. As evidence, he 
points to the acute differences between the scope and style of representations of animals and 
representation of humans in Lascaux. In the cave, there is only one human fIgure, 
presumably male. Unlike the lusWy detailed bison, horse and antelope, this human is litde 
52 Ibid. 
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more than a schematic stick figure (fig. 3). The degree to which the artists could accurately 
depict animal forms is abundantly clear, and so it is all the more significant that they chose to 
represent the human in a way that renders him merely recognizable as human, and not a life­
like depiction. In "A Visit to Lascaux," Bataille argues that the reason for this artistic choice 
is that humans were already present in their hunting ritual, and thus unlike the animals, did 
not need to be rendered present through painting.53 However, in another essay titled "The 
Passage from Animal to Man and the Birth of Art," he argues that the difference in 
representation stemmed from the humans' belief in the sovereignty of the animals relative to 
themselves. 
Figure 3. Human figure, Lascaux, France ca. 15,000 B.C.E. Mineral pigments on calcite. 
53 Ibid., 50. 
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To defend this claim, Bataille points to two curious features of the stick figure: the 
face resembles that of a long-beaked bird more than a human, and a small protuberance just 
above the legs suggests an erect penis. Bataille identifies in the depiction of the human a 
striking reversal of self-representation in contemporary Western culture. He suggests that 
today we customarily view the face as the expressive locus of our distinctly human 
subjectivity, and at the same time we strive to conceal the genitals due to its association with 
our more "animal" functions such as sex and excretion. For Bataille, the depiction of the 
human indicates a reversal of these values in Magdalenian society: 
The decisive 'Step (from animal to man) took place when man saw himself for what 
he had become, -accepted, far from feeling ashamed of, as we do, the share of the 
animal that remained within him, and disguised the humanity that distinguished him 
from the animals. He masked the face of which we are proud, and he flaunted that 
which our clothes conceal.54 
In other words, Bataille suggests that humans had already begun to perceive themselves as 
distinct from other animals by this point, but that this perception was a source of shame. 
Thus the human depicted himself as hiding the face in which the distinction in 
consciousness from other animals could be perceived (through a mask of a bird) and 
displaying the genitalia that he shared with males of other species. However, in the very act 
of pictorial representation, the human performatively expressed the consciousness he was 
hoping to conceal in his self-representation before the depicted animals. 
False Assumptions of Relation 
While I find Bataille's reading ofLascaux to be compelling, certain facts have 
emerged since the time of his writing that discredit one of his most fundamental 
54 Georges Bataille, "The Passage from Animal to Man and the Birth ofArt," The Cradle ofHumanity: Prehistori,' 
Art and Culture, ed. Stuart Kendall, trans. J'vlichelle and Stuart Kendall (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 60-61. 
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presumptions: that the paintings were intended to assist in a hunting ritual. According to 
Brigitte and Gilles Delluc, researchers at the Museum of Prehistory in Paris and authors of 
Dis(overing Las(aux, an introductory level guidebook for sale at many French cave art tourist 
centers, the Magdalenians that painted Lascaux's bison, oxen, and horses did not hunt these 
animals. Rather their diet, clothing and tools largely came from reindeer.55 Surprisingly, out 
of 600 painted animals in the cave, only one is of a reindeer.56 If the animals of Lascaux were 
not intended to represent (or render present) desired prey, why then were they painted? 
The Dellucs suggest that the paintings were in the service of a religion that more 
closely resembles mainstream Western religions today than that of a shamanic cult. They 
write: 
Lascaux is much more like a cathedral with its nave and side aisles, than the smoke­
filled lair of a magician or shaman... (the cave), by its complexity and its graphic, 
symbolic and archaeological uniformity, is now considered to have been the work of 
a few professionals of the Faith, belonging to one or more Magdalenian families over 
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one or more generations. 
The Dellucs seem to argue that the structure of the cave and the graphic uniformity of the 
paintings suggest the possibility that Lascaux functioned as a cathedral-like religious space. 
The means of production, they assert, were similar to those found in the history ofcathedral 
art, as they appear to have been designed and executed by a select few, specially trained 
"professionals." 
While there may be more evidence to defend this claim than appears in their 
introductory text on Lascaux, the Dellucs' assertion seems to me to be far-fetched. Only 
55 Dellne and Dellne, 41.
 
56Jbid., 61.
 
57 Ibid., 63-64.
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reopened to the human world in 1940, cathedral artists and architects of the past millennium 
were certainly not inspired by visits to Lascaux. Moreover, Christian iconography and 
religious practices, while having a rich history in France, are far better explained as emerging 
out ofRoman, Greek, Byzantine, and ultimately Middle Eastern cultural history. While the 
Dellucs are likely correct in denouncing the "hunting ritual" theory based on archaeological 
evidence of the early human's hunting preferences, their alternate "cathedral" theory is 
apparently evidenced by nothing more than the formal kinship between Lascaux and 
Christian religious structures. 
In both Bataille's and the Dellucs' attempts to make sense of Lascaux, I suggest that 
we see a reappearance of the tension between otherness and relation that Bataille has 
attributed to the paintings themselves. Because of its aesthetic similarities to the art and 
architecture of our received traditions, the modem-day Western viewer may experience a 
resonance with the paintings, a feeling that the artists had a beliefs, desires, and 
consciousness similar to our own. Scholars such as Bataille and the Dellucs attempt to 
explain this resonance through their imagined origin stories. Bataille, ifwe recall, said that 
the ancient cave artists were hoping to communicate with their beloved, anticipated prey, 
citing the fact that we too respect and love the wild animals we hunt. And the Dellucs' 
cathedral theory appears to draw more on modem experiences of cathedral worship than it 
does positive evidence of an ancient religious doctrine similar to that of Christianity. I 
suggest that the modem scholar's desire and ultimate failure to assert an unambiguous 
relation between Lascaux and contemporary culture only brings into stronger relief the 
historical impasse between the Magdalenian era and our own. 
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In her essay "Beginning the History ofArt" art historian Whitney Davis argues that 
when we assume a historical continuity between the paintings of Lascaux and those of 
recorded Western art history we impose, perhaps falsely, our own artistic values on an era 
that we know very little about. She writes of Lascaux, ''What motivates its selection (as the 
origin ofWestern art) .. .is a prior commitment to a history of Greek or Michaelangelo's art 
and of Leonardo's creativity in which Lascaux is actually understood as a replication, 
admittedly retrochronologically."s8 In other words, Lascaux is posited as the origin of artistic 
values and motifs, and is deemed canonical well after the establishment of this historical 
canon. The retrochronological character of this positing is underscored by the fact that all 
painters in recorded history prior to 1940 worked with no awareness ofLascaux. If 
developments in the history of art are best understood through artist's responses to 
traditions in which they have been trained, then how can one rightfully claim that a 
prehistoric cave, concealed for the majority of recorded history, is the originator of this 
discourse? A similar criticism can be made of Bataille's "hunting ritual" theory: By 
identifying a kinship between the contemporary hunter's relationship with the wild animal, 
and the ancient artists' regard for their supposed prey, does Bataille retrochronologically 
posit a certain set of beliefs or attitudes that more rightfully belong to contemporary hunting 
culture? I suggest that any relation we identify on the basis of Lascaux's apparent formal 
similarities with Western painting is thus a false one, because the artistic and cultural 
concepts around which these supposed relations are theorized are too thoroughly 
entrenched in our own discourses. 
58 Whitney Davis, "Beginning the History of Art," The Journal ofAesthetics andArl Criticism 51, no. 3 (Summer 
1993): 329. 
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In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno writes that it is ill-founded to believe that we can ever 
decipher the meaning behind the earliest surviving works of art. He argues that we only have 
a visual record of a particular moment in ancient human life, and that to derive its full 
meaning would require evidence of the larger cultural context in which it was situated. He 
writes: 
The earliest surviving manifestations of art are not the most authentic, nor do they in 
any way circumscribe art's range; and rather than best exemplifying what art is, they 
make it more obscure. It needs to be taken into account that the oldest surviving art, 
the cave paintings, belongs as a whole to the visual domain. Next to nothing is 
known of the music or poetry of the epoch; there are no indications of anything 
prehistoric that may have differed qualitatively from the optical works59 
As Adorno points out, the Paleolithic paintings at Lascaux and other caves were part of a 
meaningful context that may have included other cultural activities, such as music or poetry, 
which could not have survived to the present day. Our visual record of Magdalenian culture 
is effectively a fragment, and from this fragment we cannot rightfully claim to understand 
the purpose behind these works. Moreover, we cannot make any conclusions from the cave 
paintings about the origin of art as such. Adorno also insists that we lack the temporal context 
that would illuminate the intended meaning of these works. "The cave drawings," he writes, 
"are stages of a process and in no wayan early one.,,60 How are we to interpret Lascaux ifwe 
do not know what practices, accidents, and discoveries led the Magdalenians to paint the 
animals the way they did, or for that matter, to paint at all? Moreover, how can we 
understand the paintings ifwe do not know what further practices, accidents or discoveries 
were prompted by the paintings in the history of Magdalenian culture? These insights into 
59 Adorno, 325. 
60 Ibid., 329. 
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the fragmentary character ofLascaux lllgWight exactly how ill-founded it is to assume that 
we can uncover a relation between Magdalenian culture and our own. 
"More Clearly than All Clarity": The Possibility of Encounter at Lascaux 
However, for those who have visited Lascaux (or its replica61) themselves, and for 
those who have read firsthand accounts of others' visits, the idea that one cannot rightfully 
posit a relation between the Magdalenian and the modem human may not sit well. I myself 
have not visited Lascaux or any prehistoric cave paintings for that maUer, but I have read of 
others' experience in the space, and have been told stories by a friend who recently visited 
some of France's decorated caves. From these accounts, it is clear that many who encounter 
the actual cave are able to feel a profound, deeply visceral connection. Bataille, whose 
impassioned interpretations ofLascaux were informed by his own visits to the cave, argues 
that, "It goes without saying that these paintings are viewable, they enchant everyone who 
sees them, and they allow us to feel closer to the earliest men.,,62 Is the aforementioned 
formal similarity between these ancient images and our received tradition of Western 
painting enough to merit the visceral connection felt when in the presence ofLascaux? Or is 
something else at play that has so far gone unacknowledged? 
Although these firsthand accounts tell us that an encounter with Lascaux is powerful, 
they also indicate that something of this encounter exceeds our articulation. Bataille quotes 
Marcel Ravidat, one of the four boys who first discovered Lascaux, as saying about his initial 
61 "Lascaux II," the life-sized reproduction of the cave, will be discussed at length later in this essay. 
62 Georges Bataille, "A Meeting in Lascaux: Civilized Man Rediscovers the Man ofDesire," The Cradle of 
Humanity: PrehistoricArtand Culture, ed. Stuart Kendall, trans. Michelle and Stuart Kendall (New York: Zone 
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exploration: "Our joy was indescribable; a group of wild savages doing a war dance would 
not have done better." 63 Ravidat admits that he can not articulate the experience of 
encountering those paintings for the fIrst time, but we also know that it was joyously 
exhilarating, as he likened his reaction to an unbridled, ecstatic dance. It is interesting, 
however, that when we attempt to theorize a connection between the Magdalenian people and 
modem humans we are ultimately forced to admit that we remain confounded by a historical 
and cultural distance that is in all likelihood unbridgeable. 
The distinction between the powerful yet indescribable relation felt when in the 
presence of Lascaux, and the failed attempts to articulate a theoretically and historically 
sound connection between the Magdalenian era and our own, might be explained by Buber 
as indicative of the unique temporal character of art. In I and Thou, Buber briefly discusses 
how art exhibits a tension between the creative proew' as a holistic, I-You dialogue between 
the artist and the emergent form, and thefiniJhedwork as a "thing among things"64 in the It-
world. The artistic process begins when an artist fInds herself confronted by a form or an 
idea that "wants to be a work through (the artist)" and "demands the soul's creative 
power.,,65 The actual creation of the work is the artist's attempt to respond to the demands 
of the form. This requires the artist to refrain from inquiring into the form's origin, meaning 
or purpose, as doing so would take her out of the relation. The artist, according to Buber, 
"sees (the form) radiant in the splendor of confrontation, far more clearly than all clarity of 
the experienced world. Not as a thing among the 'internal' things, not as a fIgment of the 
63 Marcel Ravidat, personal communication with Leon Laval, date unknown. Quoted in Georges Bataille, 
"Lecture, January 18, 1955," The Cradle ofHumaniry: Prehistoric An and Culture, ed. Stuart Kendall, trans. Michelle
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'imagination,' but as what is present.,,66 In other words, the artist clearly recognizes the form 
precisely because it is fully present to her; her encounter is unhindered by past knowledge or 
memories, nor by anticipations of the future. The form does not yet have qualities that 
permit it to be described as a part of the "experienced" world such as mass, volume, or 
texture; if it did, it would not demand of the artist to be made into a work. Yet the form is 
also irreducible to the "inner" life of the artist, which means that it is not fully explainable as 
emerging out of the artist's feelings, ideas or will to create. If it were, the artist would not 
regard the form as a confrontation with something other than herself. Indeed, the only 
"quality" of the form that confronts the artist, if it can even be called such, is the fact that it 
is it fully engaged by the artist in the present moment. 
Yet because the artist responds to the form's demand that it be made into a work, 
the dialogic encounter between the two concludes with the artist "lead(ing) the form across" 
from the realm of the holistic You "into the world of It.,,67As an object, the fmished work of 
art, unlike the form encountered by the artist, does belong to the experienceable world. 
Viewers, listeners and otherwise perceiving subjects can evaluate the work in terms of its 
material qualities, such as mass, volume, or pitch, as well as by the works' formal relationship 
to its surroundings. Perceiving subjects may also recognize certain aspects of the work as 
derivative from moments in the artist's life, or as expressions of certain emotional struggles. 
The work of art, emerging from the "You" of the form, is now an "It," an object that can be 
classified, analyzed, and evaluated. Unlike the artistic process, a dialogic encounter fully 
66 Ibid., 61. 
67 Ibid. 
66 
entrenched in the present moment, the perceivable and experienceable finished work has an 
enduring, continuous existence with a recordable past and predictable future. 
We see in this description of the work of art a similar tension between that of 
distance and relation which we have already discussed. For the perceiving subject, the work 
may not have the same significance or power that the unrealized form once did for the artist. 
However, the work's very existence is conditioned by the I-You encounter between the artist 
and the form. The work of art is the literal objectification of a dialogic relation, yet it is not 
the relation itself. However, promisingly, Buber suggests that "the receptive beholder may be 
bodily confronted now and again."68 That is, a finished art object may for whatever reason 
confront (or one might say "move") a perceiving subject if she is able to bring herself fully 
into the present moment with the work. 
I suggest that the contrast between the indescribably moving encounter many have 
had with Lascaux, and the failed attempts to articulate our relationship with it in theoretical 
terms, can be explained by Buber's differentiation between the dialogic, process-based 
"encounter" with an aesthetic form, and the describable "experience" of a finished work. If a 
visitor to Lascaux is moved by her encounter of these extraordinary spaces, Buber would say 
that it is because she is present with it, and thus she "sees it radiant in the splendor of 
confrontation, far more clearly than all clarity of the experienced world." Those who attempt 
to establish a theoretical, historical relation between the Magdalenian art and modem human 
culture, by contrast, describe the paintings in terms of visible and tangible qualities, and place 
them in the context of our established cultural discourses. 
68 Ibid. 
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The connections forged by theory, on this view, are less informative than those 
found in the encountering presence of the paintings themselves. Yet, as I have already hinted 
in my discussions of Bataille and the Dellucs, some of these theories appear to have been 
informed by powerful moments of encounter. Bataille's most compelling evidence for his 
"hunting ritual" theory seems to be the paintings' ability to evoke a hunter's breathtaking 
encounter with a wild animal. And the Delluc's "cathedral" theory is apparently evidenced by 
not much more than the formal similarities between the cave and a Catholic cathedral, 
another kind of space in which many people feel an awe-inspiring, sacred presence. If these 
two theories do at least partially derive from the scholars' powerfully visceral encounters 
with Lascaux itself, however, the connections between these encounters and other profound 
moments in human life can only be made, keeping with Buber, eifier the moment has ended. 
One cannot be fully present with the paintings if her thoughts are elsewhere, such as in 
cathedrals and on hunting trips. 
Therefore, if we are to successfully identify a connection between modem humanity 
and Lascaux, a surviving expression of our supposed original ancestors, I suggest that we 
turn our attention to our relational comportment at the moment in which we are present in 
the cave. As a way into this problem I look to Benjamin's notion of aura, as explained in his 
1939 essay "The Work ofArt in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility." Although I 
do not intend to explicitly address the main theme of the essay, namely, the diagnosis of 
revolutionary potential in the decay of aura in twentieth-century material culture, Benjamin's 
term is nonetheless indispensable for our purposes. In line with our discussion thus far, aura 
is defined as a particular tension between otherness and relation in a perceiving subject's 
engagement with a work of art, and, significantly, this tension is precisely what gives art its 
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aesthetic value. The character and intensity of an artwork's aura, moreover, emerges out of 
the historical life of the work itself, and it is this insight that will help us articulate what 
happens in the moment of encounter at Lascaux. By examining the history of the modem 
public's relationship with the cave since its discovery in 1940, we will find that that certain 
aspects of our supposedly immediate presence before the painting are in fact mediated, and 
are thus in need of analysis and critique. 
Aura: "The Unique Apparition of a Distance" 
"The Work ofArt in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility" is a sustained 
inquiry into the possibilities that changes in artistic medium hold for the transformation of 
aesthetic discourse, as well as its revolutionary potential for the working class. In this essay, 
Benjamin focuses specifically on media through which the formal qualities of a work of art 
can be reproduced en masse, such as photography, radio, and film. He argues that works 
previously accessible to only an elite minority with the economic means to acquire or visit 
them and/or the proper education to appreciate them, could now be accessed and evaluated 
by nearly anyone. One need not own a Picasso painting in order to have a "Picasso" in her 
living room; she need only purchase a print worth far less than the original. Moreover, one 
does not need play tickets in order to take in a dramatic performance; she can go to a 
cinema. The film reel can repeat the same performance an infmite number of times to 
audiences in distant locations for a significantly lower cost. 
For Benjamin, technologies of reproducibility and the development ofworks 
specifically designed and marketed for mass reproduction have revolutionary potential. 
Oppressed classes now had access to art through reproduction, and with this access came 
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new opportunities to evaluate and critique art. They could discuss the merits and 
shortcomings ofworks with many others who had access to same reproductions, and their 
patronage (or lack thereof) could determine the style and content of future works. Thus the 
advent of technological reproducibility grants these masses the authority to reinforce or 
transform cultural values. The value of art is no longer tied down to the uniqueness of the 
individual object or artist, but is instead associated with mass appeal. The difference between 
the outmoded "bourgeois" aesthetics and the revolutionary new aesthetics, made possible by 
technological reproducibility, hinge on what Benjamin calls "aura." The bourgeois art of 
yesteryear, ofwhich we are still accustomed to define as art, gains its value from aura. The 
revolutionary, reproducible art of today, for which we do not yet have an established 
vocabulary, is transformative because it signals the decqy of aura. 
Aura is a difficult term, and its meaning is the source of a lively debate within the 
secondary literature. However, before I refer to others' thoughts on the term, I would like to 
take Benjamin's own defmition as a starting point: 
We define the aura (of natural objects) as the unique apparition of a distance, 
however near it may be. To follow with the eye-while resting on a summer 
aftemoon-a mountain range on the horizon or a branch that casts its shadow on 
the beholder is to breathe the aura of those mountains, of that branch. In light of 
this description, we can readily grasp the social basis of the aura's present decay. It 
rests on two circumstances, both linked to the increasing significance of the masses 
in contemporary life. Namely: the desire ifthe present-dqy masses to ''get closer" to things 
spatiallY and humanlY, and their equallYpassionate concernfor overcoming each thing's uniqueness 
I!J assimilating it as a reproduction.69 
This passage, which begins by comparing the aura of art to that of natural objects, and ends 
by describing the social conditions of aura's decay, is the closest Benjamin comes to a direct 
69 Walter Benjamin, "The Work ofArt in the Age ofIts Technological Reproducibility" (Ibird Version), trans. 
Harry Zohn and Edmund Jephcott, Walter Betifamin: Selected Writings, vol. 4, 1938-1940, ed. Howard Eiland and 
Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 255. (emphasis in original) 
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defmition of the tenn in this essay. His choice oflanguage in his discussion of nature, 
however, is illuminating. The aura of a mountain range or a branch is perceived by one who 
ftllows its fonn with the eye. It thus appears that the comprehension of an object's aura 
requires a particular sort of attention to on the part of the subject, an adherence to the 
fonnal demands of the object. In his example of the mountain, it seems as though Benjamin 
argues that the auratic object is somehow physically present to the subject, as he claims that 
the subject "breathes" the aura of the mountains, and the particularity of the context (a 
summer afternoon) appears to be important. Yet despite the apparent necessity of presence 
before the auratic object, this particulardescription is preceded by Benjamin's claim that the 
aura is "the unique apparition of a distance, however near it may be." Therefore, I would like 
to suggest that the auratic object, as appearing distant, and as something to which the subject 
must perceptually attend or follow, is similar to the demanding fonn that confronts the artist 
in a Buberian I-You encounter. 
This claim is reinforced when we critically examine what exactly Benjamin means 
when he speaks of the aura as an apparition of "distance." Near the end of the passage, 
Benjamin attributes aura's decay to the "desire of the present-day masses' desire to 'get 
closer' to things, spatially and humanly, and their equally passionate concern for overcoming 
each thing's uniqueness by assimilating it as a reproduction." In other words, the subject 
who does not establish and/or maintain perceptual distance from the work effectively 
damages that work's aura. Why does Benjamin emphasize that the desire to "get closer to 
things" is both "spatial" and "human?" And how is the desired closure of the auratic distance 
between subject and work related to the overcoming of the work's "uniqueness?" 
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First of all, the question of "spatial" distance seems intuitive enough: present-day 
masses, according to Benjamin, desire access to works of art that are physically remote, such 
as a famous painting hanging in a far-away museum. Yet what does it mean to get humanlY 
closer to a work? This mysterious concept may become clear when we consider the tension 
between otherness and relation that we have already seen exemplified with Lascaux. The 
ancient cave art, I have suggested, resists any sort of complete explanation of its origin or 
purpose, and yet remains a higWy meaningful cultural treasure in Western discourse. This 
impenetrability ofmeaning could be what Benjamin refers to as a human, rather than spatial 
distance. To become close to an auratic work of art on a human level, then, -I suggest, would 
be to find a common plane upon which the subject can engage with the work, to somehow 
reduce its otherness to us. Yet because aura is also considered by Benjamin to be sort of an 
aesthetic value, we can see that the auratic work's distance, or otherness, may also be that 
which so profoundly affects those who encounter it. 
This reading of the word humanlY also sheds light on Benjamin's claim that the decay 
of aura is facilitated by a "concern for overcoming each thing's uniqueness." If a work's 
uniqueness is preconditioned by its distance from the perceiving subject, reproduction will 
bring the work into the same sphere as the subject. No longer part of a meaningful world 
independent of the subject's existence, the reproduced work can appear in the subject's 
immediately lived world, in places such as the home, or the newspapers, cinemas and radios 
to which the subject continually refers. Thus the unique, "distant" value of the work makes 
way for meanings predominately conditioned by the subject's life. This insight echoes the 
claim I have made earlier, regarding the retrochronological character of theories regarding 
Lascaux. When we attempt to assimilate the cave into our own historically and culturally 
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specific network of meanings, we reduce its otherness to us, and thus perhaps bring it 
"closer" to our lived world. As some Benjamin scholars have pointed out, these moves of 
assimilation can have profound social and ethical consequences. Jennifer Todd, in her essay 
"Production, Reception, Criticism: Walter Benjamin and the Problem ofMeaning in Art," 
notes that the overcoming of art's uniqueness through media of reproducibility was of grave 
concern for Adorno, a sharp critic of Benjamin's essay. When the subject no longer regards 
the work as distant from or outside of her immediate life, she engages the work on her own 
terms, and thus does not respond to the perceptual or attitudinal demands of the auratic 
work. While Benjamin saw this as offering greater cultural authority to the working class, 
Adorno, by contrast, identified a hindrance to class consciousness. Todd writes: 
It is, after all, a commonplace ofMarxist theory that the working class is not 
immediately aware of its real interests and ofwhat is politically most useful for it. As 
Adorno has pointed out, when the relationship between audience and art-object is 
reversed so that the audience sees what it pleases in the work, the audience simply 
projects its own psychology, needs, and obsessions onto the work and sees a 
standardized echo of itself; thereby it learns nothing.70 
I do not bring Adorno (via Todd) into the discussion in order to rehash the debate over the 
revolutionary potential ofmass media. Rather, I use this to illustrate the relational implications 
of aura and its decay. In her summary ofAdorno's position, Todd indicates that the decay of 
aura results in the subject projecting her own "psychology, needs, and obsessions," onto the 
work, rather than recognizing meaning in the work that's distant or other than herself. 
My interpretation of aura as a fundamentally relational phenomenon work is very 
much in line with the argument put forth by Benjamin scholar Diarumuid Costello in his 
essay, "Aura, Face Photography: Re-Reading Benjamin today." Costello notes that much of 
70 Jennifer Todd, "Production, Reception, Criticism: Walter Benjamin and the Problem ofMeaning in Art," 
Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. Gary Smith, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 105. 
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the secondary literature on aura centers on the material and formal qualities of art oijects to 
the exclusion of any consideration of the sul:ject's role in the creation or maintenance of aura. 
Ifwe examine aura as a phenomenon ultimately dependent on the perceiving subject, he 
argues that we will discover how aura deftnes a particular mode of perception itself: 
Aura is best understood as a predicate pertaining to the subject rather than the object 
of perception; it describes how that subject is capable of encountering its objects, 
whatever they may be-namely, auratically or otherwise. Once the capad!J to perceive 
'auratically' wanes then, evidently, nothing will exhibit an aura any longer; this is to 
say that aura is a quality that not only requires a subject for its perception, but a 
speciftc, historically circumscribed, mode of perception on the part of the subject.71 
Thus according to Costello, the subject establishes aura through her capacity to perceive 
"auratically," which, from our analysis ofBenjamin's own deftnition, we could redeftne as 
perception ifa distance withinproximiry. Moreover, the aura of a work of art decays when our 
ability for auratic perception likewise deteriorates; when we, to use Benjamin's language 
again, "get closer" to things. 
When reading Benjamin's discussion of aura in this way, Costello argues that we 
discover "the ethical signiftcance of aura, its relation to respect...or, more generally, as an 
ability to relate to others as others.,,72 Costello's assertion here is an explicit statement of 
what's at stake in my particular reading of Benjamin and its relevance to our discussion of 
Lascaux thus far. In our examination ofLascaux as a possible site whereby we may identify 
the origin of our capacity both relate and posit otherness, we found that we ourselves must 
seek the proper conditions for maintaining both distance from and relation to Lascaux, and 
it was suggested that a moment of presence with the cave itself may be the way to this 
71 Diannuid Costello, "Aura, Face, Photography: Re-Reading Benjamin Today," Walter Benjamin andArl, ed. 
Andrew Benjamin (New York: Continuum, 2005) 167-68. 
72 Ibid., 177. 
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achieve this ideal comportment. Aura, as the apprehension of distance within presence, thus 
seems to describe the exact aesthetic attitude we wish to cultivate. And so, while I do not 
want my reading of aura to be interpreted as a rejection of Benjamin's main thesis in the 
"Work ofArt" essay, I do argue along with Adorno and Costello that the decay of aura 
could be ethically dangerous, as indicates the subject's disregard for alterity. 
However, I also suggest that the aura of an artwork can be cultivated and perceived 
in ways that inadequately respond to the work's otherness from us. In what follows, I will 
discuss how apprehension ofLascaux's aura is mediated by our history with the cave, which 
in turn is indicative of the values with which modern humans have approached it. In my 
retelling of Lascaux's history as an unprecedented discovery, a tourist attraction, a critically 
endangered historical landmark and the model for a painstakingly accurate life-sized replica, I 
will suggest that a particular idea of "auratic" encounter is reinforced for visitors, one that is 
dictated by what we believe an encounter with one's origin should be. 
The Auratic History of an Endangered Origin 
While we have an idea of the perceiving subject's role in maintaining or destroying a 
work's aura, we have not discussed what it is about certain works of art that compel us to 
treat it as worthy of auratic regard. For Benjamin, the existence of an aura in a work of art 
largely depends on its authentici!J, which in turn can be defined as the unique, particular, 
and/or unprecedented character of the work's historical existence, "the here and now.,,73 
From this definition, we can already begin to articulate the factors contributing to Lascaux's 
aura as a site of origin. As I have already suggested, not only do many regard the paintings to 
73 Benjamin, 253. 
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be some of the earliest surviving evidence of a distinctly human consciousness, they are also 
widely regarded some of the most aesthetically captivating and artistically accomplished of 
these early works. However, Benjamin also writes that the historical uniqueness of an auratic 
work "includes change to the physical structure of the work over time, together with any 
changes of ownership."74 Therefore, on this view, the auratic character ofLascaux can also 
be derived from our contemporary history with the cave, including its discovery, its 
international regard as a historical landmark and cultural treasure and the physical changes to 
the cave itself that have resulted from this regard. Therefore, in this section, I will focus 
specifically on the character of Lascaux's aura through the lens its social and pf?ysical history of 
the past sixty eight years following its discovery. 
Lascaux, as the story goes, was discovered by accident by four boys searching for a 
dog who had run into the cave. However, this story is not entirely true. According to 
Bataille, the entrance of the cave was first discovered by a local woman searching for a place 
to dispose with the body of her dead donkey. She pushed the body into the hole, which had 
only recently appeared when a storm had uprooted a tree near her property, and saw that the 
body fell much farther than she had expected. When the woman brought this incident up in 
conversation with Marcel Ravidat, he then decided to round up three of his friends and 
explore this surprisingly deep fissure.75 However, despite the fact that the exploration of 
Lascaux was premeditated rather than accidental, the discovery of several chambers worth of 
ancient cave paintings was expected by no one prior to the excursion. The embellishments 
that have come to be part of the more popular account are perhaps there to underscore the 
74 Ibid.
 
75 Bataille, "Lecture, January 15, 1955," 95.
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unexpected nature of their discovery. According to Davis, the appeal of this legendary story 
may in fact relate to the positing of Lascaux as a significant site for the study of human 
origin. She writes, " ...the circumstances of its discovery are accidental and dramatic, 
confmning two of our longstanding intuitions about what an 'origin' should look like.,,76 In 
other words, because the discovery of Lascaux was an unexpected yet pivotal moment in 
twentieth-century cultural history, we might also be predisposed to think of Lascaux itself as 
bom from a similarly powerful, singular event in the early history of our species. 
I thus want to suggest that the imagined moment of Lascaux's dramatic discovery is 
itself a key factor in the development of Lascaux'g aura, particularly in relation to its public 
opening as a tourist attraction in 1948. The auratic significance of this moment is made clear 
in Bataille's account of his visit to the cave as a tourist. He laments that the tourist's 
experience of Lascaux was not, and indeed could not be as powerful as the one had by 
Ravidat and his friends. In an untided lecture delivered on January 18, 1955, Bataille 
described the tourist's experience of Lascaux and contrasted it unfavorably with the 
imagined moment of discovery: 
First you enter a small room where, as in a subway station, admission tickets are sold 
and where...a number of people patiendy await the departure of the preceding group. 
When this group leaves, one joins the succeeding group, which descends in tum into 
the cave, directed by a guide. In sum, I have to admit, these are not the best 
conditions to be introduced into the world of the flISt men...this is why I always 
think back to the time when the first of our contemporaries entered the cave, when 
they suddenly found themselves in the presence of these marvels that no one had 
laid eyes on for fifteen thousand years. In this moment, if I had found myself there, 
it seems to me that I could truly have entered this long-lost world, whereas now...the 
present world follows me, it descends into the cave with me.77 
76 Davis, 327.
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Bataille notes how the measures taken to render Lascaux accessible to tourists-and the 
presence of the tourists themselves-makes it difficult to access the "vanished world" of 
which the paintings are a remnant. He longs to have seen the cave before its transformation 
into a tourist attraction, to have suddenly stumbled upon an unprecedented discovery. Thus 
part of the aura of the cave for Bataille is the moment of its discovery, and that this 
privileged experience of being the first to encounter the cave would be forever cut off from 
all visitors thereafter. 
IfBataille visited the cave as if he were expecting to encounter a "vanished world," 
or to perceive a remnant of an ancient culture other than his own, we could say that his visit 
to the cave was motivated by a desire to perceive or participate in Lascaux's aura: namely, to 
attend to a work of art that maintains historical and cultural distance even within physical 
proximity. One might speculate, moreover, that the possibility of an auratic encounter of this 
sort is what motivated many other visitors' excursion to Lascaux. In privileging the moment 
of discovery, we see the particular way that distance is asserted in the historical establishment 
of Lascaux's aura. However, the daily presence of large groups of tourists, as well as the 
physical measures taken to increase the cave's accessibility (such as the addition of stairs and 
a ticket counter) made it difficult for Bataille to cultivate the auratic attention necessary to 
properly engage with the cave paintings. One might say, based on this account that, the 
opening of Lascaux to tourism worked to decay the paintings' aura. 
However, I suggest that the auratic character of Lascaux was heightened with its 
designation as a tourist attraction, for two interrelated reasons. First, the opening of Lascaux 
to tourism in itselfsuggested to the public that a visit to the cave would be a historically 
insightful and personally rewarding experience. Second, the fact that the tourist's visit is 
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mediated by contemporary technologies underscores the temporal and circumstantial 
difference between their encounter with Lascaux and that of the dramatic discovery. And 
while Bataille was disappointed with his distance from the privileged moment of discovery, 
the fact that he recognized this distance may have given a whole new dimension to his 
auratic regard for Lascaux. For while Bataille was in the presence of the same ancient 
paintings that were so dramatically discovered in 1940, he was aware that he did not-and 
indeed could not-stumble upon a "vanished world" in the context of his guided tour. 
Through the very act of rendering Lascaux physically accessible to the public, the possibility 
of a privileged, dramatic first encounter with the cave became more distant. Thus, I suggest 
that this particular tension between distance and proximity reinforced the cave's auratic 
character. 
While the opening ofLascaux to tourism contributed to its auratic character through 
the simultaneous act of rendering it accessible to the public and establishing a distance from 
the legendary moment of discovery, the events surrounding its closure would enhance its aura 
even more. Just fifteen years after its opening to tourism in 1948, Lascaux was barred from 
public view after it was deduced that the measures taken to increase public accessibility had 
damaged the paintings. In addition to widening the cave entrance and adding stairs so as to 
better accommodate large groups of visitors, lamps had also been installed above the 
paintings for improved visibility. These physical changes and additions, along with increased 
levels of carbon dioxide from the breath of the million-plus visitors who passed through 
during its period of tourism, disrupted the atmospheric balance that had maintained the 
paintings' integrity over time. In 1958 Ravidat, now a tour guide, noticed creeping plant 
growth over the paintings where before there had been none, likely made possible by the 
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lamplight and the carbon dioxide-rich atmosphere. An attempt to treat this plant growth 
with a solution of formaldehyde and antibiotics, however, led to calcite deposits that covered 
over even more of the paintings. In 1963, the French Ministry of Culture deemed it 
necessary to close the cave to the public. After its closure, machinery was installed to 
maintain a constant level of carbon dioxide, temperature and moisture in the cave. This 
machinery successfully prevented any further deterioration until 1999, when it had to be 
replaced. During this brief period without atmospheric stasis, mold and bacteria returned to 
the cave, and at a much faster rate than before.78 Since then, conservationists have had to 
battle two particularly dangerous strains of mold, one ofwhich has still not been successfully 
eradicated.79 
Despite its physical deterioration and its closure to the public, however, tourists have 
been able to "experience" Lascaux by visiting an exact replica of two of the cave's main 
chambers: the Painted (or Axial) Gallery and the Bulls' Chamber. This site, called "Lascaux 
II" was completed in 1983 and is situated partially underground at a site near the original 
work. It is thus hoped that tourists will be able to have an experience similar to a visit to 
Lascaux without threatening the integrity of the original paintings. An educational website 
on Lascaux sponsored by the French Ministry of Culture details the amount of time, 
materials, and labor that went into the creation of an exact, life-sized replica of the cave. 
First, careful measurements were taken of the cave's dimensions, and a concrete mold of the 
78 Delluc and Delluc, 72. 
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walls was made to match these dimensions, supported by intricately arranged iron bars.8o The 
texture of the caves, moreover, was recreated with the aid of stereoscopic photographs, and 
projected images of the paintings were used by artists to recreate the animals on the concrete 
walls, in accordance with the reproduced bumps and crannies.8 ! The paintings, moreover, 
have been reproduced with the same mineral pigments that the ancient artists had used. 
The decision to close Lascaux to the public, and the ongoing efforts to preserve the 
paintings from deterioration, clearly indicate that the cave is for us a unique and culturally 
significant space worthy of our protection; in other words, it is auratic. Moreover, the 
closure of the Lascaux to all but an elite group of archaeologists and conservationists is itself 
a contributor to the cave's aura, as the public is now physically distanced from an important 
and fragile work. However, what is one to make of "Lascaux II?" Does the exact replica of 
the original cave work to undermine its aura by demonstrating our ability to reproduce 
Lascaux, and thus render it unnecessary? Or does it contribute to its aura by acting as a 
physical reminder of the existence of an ancient painted cave that is too fragile to handle 
visitors? 
Lascaux Today and the Aura of the First Modem Moment 
As we already know, Benjamin argues in his "Work ofArt" essay that the 
reproducibility of auratic works can lead to the empowerment of the subject, and a 
diJempowerment of the unique, historically authentic work. We can see how Lascaux II 
might effect a transformation of this sort. In order to reproduce Lascaux, painstakingly 
80 French Ministry of Culture, "The Closing of the Cave, 1963," The Cave at Lascaux, 
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careful measurements had to be made of the cave's structure, and hundreds of paintings 
were recreated to scale with the exact same pigments used by the original artists. The fact 
that Lascaux II was made at all thus indicates that we have accumulated a remarkable 
storehouse of knowledge about the cave. Even without a replica cave, it is clear that one 
does not need to refer to the original Lascaux in order to learn about it. For instance, my 
writing of this essay required me to learn some basic facts about the history of Lascaux, the 
Magdalenian era, the geology of the Dordogne region's cave system and the content and 
composition of the paintings. However, I have never been to Lascaux, much less Lascaux II. 
My research was conducted through books, journal articles, websites and newspaper articles 
on the subject, all ofwhich included drawings or photographs of different cave paintings. It 
is thus possible to become an authority on Lascaux (although I am in no way claiming to be 
one) without ever having to obtain access to the cave itself. However, if one argues, as I 
have already suggested, that a more genuine understanding of Lascaux requires a moment of 
presence with the work itself, Lascaux II also seems to render the original cave unnecessary, 
as it attempts to recreate the conditions for an embodied encounter of this sort. 
Yet can one's presence within a replicated cave, no matter how accurate, be identical 
to that of the original? The visitor's knowledge that she is visiting Lascaux II, and not 
Lascaux itself, indicates that she is prepared for a qualitatively different experience. She may 
be impressed, or even moved by the carefully rendered paintings, but unlike the tourists of 
the 1950's, much less Ravidat and his three fellow explorers, she knows that she is not in the 
presence of 17,OOO-year-old art. Perhaps part of the power of her experience is her 
admiration for the research, precision and labor that went into the construction of such an 
ambitious replica. But more importandy, the very existence of Lascaux II communicates the 
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auratic significance of the original cave to the visitor. On the one hand, Lascaux II was built 
so that the original cave will be protected from further deterioration, thus signifying that the 
site is worthy of our protection. And on the other hand, Lascaux II's very existence is due in 
part to a belief that the public should experience Lascaux; that is, many believe that an 
encounter with these ancient paintings is moving, edifying, or otherwise worthwhile, and 
thus should be facilitated in spite of the original site's deterioration. 
I therefore argue that the life-sized reproduction ofLascaux is perhaps the most 
significant contributor to the cave's aura today. By reproducing the cave for the experiential 
benefit of visitors, Lascaux II reveals a multifaceted distance between the contemporary 
visitor and the imagined site of origin. Not only is the visitor physically distanced from the 
original cave, but her presence in Lascaux II signifies her historical distance from the brief 
period of time before the cave's deterioration. Yet Lascaux II, the space that reminds her of 
distance from the privileged time and space ofLascaux itself, also brings the cave into a sort 
ofproximity. We know that the structure of Lascaux II is identical to that of the original cave. 
Moreover, given our knowledge of the deterioration of the original paintings, we can 
presume the reproduced images at Lascaux II are in better condition than, and thus closer to 
what could be called the paintings' "original state." 
Earlier, I suggested that the way in which the aura of a work of art is cultivated could 
be worthy of critique. And in our dual consideration of both the preservation and replication 
of Lascaux, I believe we can begin to articulate a problem with our auratic regard. For the 
past forty six years, conservationists have been attempting to undo some of the damage 
done to Lascaux following its discovery. And the ambitious reproduction of Lascaux is an 
attempt to create conditions by which a more intact version of the cave can be safely viewed. 
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Both of these phenomena, I suggest, are an attempt to "return" Lascaux to a more original 
state. However, this desired state is not the one in which it was left 17,000 years ago; rather, 
I argue that it is the state in which it was found in 1940, the state that enabled Ravidat and his 
friends to encounter a "vanished world." I defend my claim by pointing to the fact that 
Lascaux is considered important enough to be witnessed or encountered by modem 
humans, rather than simply be left alone and studied through textbooks and images. If the 
moment of the ftrst modem encounter was not of primary auratic signiftcance, then why 
would there be so much effort taken to facilitate public encounters today? Recalling Bataille's 
lament that as a tourist in the 1950's, his encounter with Lascaux was deftnitively less 
powerful than that of the cave's ftrst modem witnesses, it could be argued that the efforts to 
preserve and replicate Lascaux attempt to reinstate the conditions for that imagined initial 
encounter, while simultaneously acknowledging that it would be impossible to do so 
completely. 
To recall Davis, the legendary moment of discovery may have become so central to 
Lascaux's aura because it resembles what we think an origin should be like: accidental and 
dramatic. Through its implicit focus on recreating the conditions for an originary encounter, 
it seems as though the simultaneous reproduction and preservation of Lascaux contribute to 
the reiftcation ofwhat was essentially an unexpected and transient moment in human 
history. Recall that for Buber, a genuine I-You encounter with a work of art necessarily 
occurs in a present moment. The fact that this original moment of discovery is implicitly 
privileged in our regard for Lascaux today is testament to the power of the ftrst modem 
presence before the ancient paintings. Yet to try to recreate the conditions for that moment 
is to not respect the transient character of the encounter. Moreover, this attempt may 
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conform our expectations to a cultural standard of origin that mayor may not apply to 
Lascaux's actual early history. I am not arguing that the efforts to preserve Lascaux from 
deterioration, and the attempt to facilitate a potentially valuable experience for would-be 
visitors, are wrong or misguided. Rather, I think that if we look at what has motivated the 
acts of preservation and replication that characterize the contemporary human's relationship 
with Lascaux, we ftnd that we are exemplifying the conditions for an encountering moment 
that cannot be premeditated, reproduced or articulated, conditions that, moreover, are 
dictated by our own cultural expectations ofwhat we think Lascaux should be for us. We 
must thus ask at this point: Is the contemporary human's encounter with Lascaux, be it as a 
concerned scientist applying fungicide to the original site, a tourist visiting its duplication, or 
even the student of Lascaux (such as myself) who has visited neither of these sites, to be 
evaluated on the basis of its resemblance to the ftrst modem encounter? And if so, what is 
lost or overlooked in ourpresent encounter when a long past, irreproducible and 
retrochronologically fetishized moment becomes the standard for our own experience? 
Reframing the Possibility of Encounter 
Ifwe feel our own relation to Lascaux to be inadequate because we are too far 
removed to posit a theoretically sound connection between the Magdalenian era and our 
own, or we are unable to encounter Lascaux as if for the fIrst time in modem history, I 
suggest that we are not allowing ourselves to be fully present with Lascaux. I cannot describe 
in any positive, deftnitive sense what should be accounted for when encountering Lascaux in 
the fullness of the present, because in order to bring oneself to the present moment, one 
must not be guided by any preconceptions as to the content of this encounter. However, I 
-------------------------------------------
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can at least refer to my own experience of researching and writing about Lascaux in order to 
articulate what took for me to ftnd a moment of presence with the ancient cave, despite the 
fact that I have never even been to Lascaux II. 
As I was ftnishing my research on Lascaux, I came across several newspaper articles 
and websites detailing the most recent fungal infections that are currendy threatening the 
paintings. While visiting one such website, the home page of the International Committee 
for Preservation of Lascaux.,82 I came across an image that genuinely struck me: a painting of 
a black pony in the Axial Gallery that has been affected by a white fungus (ftg. 4). At ftrst 
glance, the small white spots in the bottom left region of the pony appear to be the texture 
of the white-walled cave peeking out from underneath the black paint, just as one can see the 
white surface of a piece of paper underneath a crayon mark. Yet after looking at a detailed 
view of the affected area, and then returning to the full image of the painting, I felt 
something akin to dread. As I now knew those white spots to be a rapidly growing fungus, I 
couldn't help but see the pony as now experiencing something like a slow death, 
disappearing into the whiteness of the wall before my eyes. This is not to say that I thought 
of the pony as an actual living animal, but rather I was able to see Lascaux as having a 
historically mutable and fragile existence subject to destruction. 
The knowledge that this pony's slow death was caused by its exposure to millions of 
humans who simply wanted to behold and enjoy Lascaux filled me with a strange sort of 
remorse. And although I was just viewing one digital image of a cave thousands of miles 
away from me, I felt present with Lascaux. I realized that at this moment, in which I and my 
82 http://savelascaux.org. 
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Figure 4. Above: Pony, Lascaux, ca. 15,000 B.C.E. Mineral pigment on limestone. Below: 
detail of white fungal deterioration on pony. From "Who Is Responsible?" on the official 
home page of the International Committee for Preservation of Lascaux: 
http://www.savelascaux.org/crisis_responsible.php. 
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world are constantly changing, one of the oldest paintings in the world is also changing, and 
that contemporary human activity is deeply implicated in its transformations. Thus while I 
realize that it is impossible to bridge the gap, either theoretically or experientially, between 
the Magdalenian era and our own through our regard for Lascaux, I was able to relate to the 
cave by recognizing it as a living participant in our history, and we as participants in its 
historical life. 
I believe that this moment of engagement with Lascaux through the digital image of 
the decaying pony could be interpreted as perceiving the cave's aura, as I felt myself to be 
responding to the unique "demands" of the image through my regard. While I initially saw 
the form of the pony by looking past the white spots near the bottom of the figure, the 
context in which I viewed the image-a website dedicated to raising awareness of Lascaux's 
deterioration-demanded that I look at the white spots as fungus, insinuating itself into the 
form. By engaging the image in this way, I perceived it as a recorded moment in the gradual 
disappearance of a painting, a literal distancing from human perception. Yet because I saw 
the fragile, transitory character of this form, I was also able to recognize Lascaux as part of 
the present, changing world much more than I could when viewing photographs, tracings, or 
diagrams of Lascaux in the more impressive, formally whole state in which it was first 
discovered. Lascaux may no longer be the perfectly preserved, awe-inspiring "other" that we 
would like to engage in order to understand our origin, but for me, the image of the pony in 
its present state elicited a response, and allowed me to recognize my relation to the ancient 
space. 
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Conclusion: The Meaning of Lascaux 
My described encounter with Lascaux is not intended to be a template for how I 
think the cave should be encountered. As I have already stated, to give a normative account of 
the modern human's relation to Lascaux would be to not respect the historical and semantic 
distance that the cave maintains from us, not to mention the singularity of the fully present 
moment necessary for the perceiving subject to relate across that distance. However, I feel 
that my encounter was insightful as to the value of a meeting with Lascaux, a subject we have 
left alone until now. In order to articulate what this value might be, I draw again on Bataille, 
who gives an account that is definitive enough to leave us satisfied, yet open-ended enough 
to avoid the fallacy of making a normative claim. 
In his January 1955 lecture, Bataille speculates on how the creators of Lascaux may 
have regarded the images as valuable or meaningful to their lives. Even if his aforementioned 
theories on early human consciousness are not adequately grounded in historical fact, we 
have no reason to disagree with Bataille's claim that life for Magdalenian humans was harsh. 
The overall climate of Europe was much colder than it is today, and we can assume that 
early humans faced an ever-present threat of starvation and premature death. Bataille writes: 
...they had no other resource than the hunt, to which gathering and fishing added 
only a meager variety...Add to this the danger of wild animals, probably already war, 
and frequent hunting accidents. It is has also been possible to study what could be, if 
not the average age, then the normal ages of adults...From this (research) we are led 
to conclude that [humans] rarely lived beyond their fiftieth birthday, and only just 
barely if they did.83 
In other words, a quick consideration of some of the most obvious defining aspects of early
 
human life allows us to see that with the ever-present threats of starvation, violence and
 
possibly disease, there was litde imaginable room for the Magdalenians to enjoy life.
 
83 Ibid., 100.
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Compared to our own technologically enhanced, comfortable existence, theirs was surely 
one of great poverty. 
Yet among the remnants from this apparendy miserable society is Lascaux, a cave 
whose paintings hold an extraordinary aesthetic power for us today. Ifwe are moved by our 
own encounters with the cave, Bataille suggests the effect that it had on the early human 
psyche was likely to have been earth-shattering. Cognizance of this commonality in 
experience across time reveals for Bataille something significant about human nature: our 
lives are enriched by that which dazzles us, enchants us or provokes wonder. And moreover, 
artistic production is a primary means by which humans from every culture throughout 
history have attempted to cultivate that sense ofwonder. Bataille thus writes of all art as 
linked by its effect on us, a common meaning that can be apprehended outside of a work's 
particular cultural or historical context: 
Every civilization made works of art under a differentpretext. But works of art all end 
up with the same result, with the result that endures after the pretext upon which 
they were made no longer has any meaning. We no more concern ourselves with the 
success of prehistoric man's hunt than we worry about the afterlife of the pharaohs, 
but the result never changes. The works constructed on these pretexts enchant us, 
and if every civilization created works that have this power to enchant in common, it 
is because they all had the same profound purpose in making them: man's 
fundamental desire, regardless of era or region, to be filled with wonder.84 
In this passage, I do not believe that Bataille rejects the claim, as articulated by Adorno 
earlier in this essay, that the meaning of a work of art derives from its place in a larger 
cultural context (or pretext), such the Paleolithic human's dependence on successful hunts or 
the funerary practices of ancient Egyptians. Rather Bataille seems to suggest that with or 
without a historically sound knowledge of the work's origin, art is still capable of stopping us 
in our tracks, taking us out of the ordinary world, or in his language, filling us with wonder. 
84 Ibid., tOO-01. 
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However, what is it about certain works of art that evoke wondrous responses from 
perceiving subjects? Can enchantment be described simply as the effect of the artist's skilled 
execution, a compelling choice of content, or knowledge of a historical people's reverence 
for the work? Each of these can playa role in the subject's enchantment with a work of art, 
but the degree to which they do so depends on the history and comportment of the subject, 
as well as the history and qualities of the art object. If something enchants us, I suggest that 
it does so precisely because we perceive something about it that exceeds our understanding, 
and that we recognize it as having significance that lies outside the spheres of meaning that 
shape our world. That is to say, works of art enchant us when we recognize their otherness 
from us. 
Throughout the course of this chapter, I have discussed various ways in which 
scholars, tourists, and otherwise appreciators of Lascaux have attempted to understand 
ourselves by engaging with the cave in a way that conforms to our contemporary 
assumptions as to how we think the origin of humanity should appear to us. However, if we 
resist the urge to make sense of Lascaux and willingly remain open to its alterity, or as Buber 
would say, engage Lascaux as a You, we may gain unexpected insights into our own nature. 
To explain how this might happen, I return to my personal example of the fungus-infected 
pony. My encounter of this image had the curious effect of making me more aware of my 
own bodily interdependence with its environment. Ordinarily, I (like many others, 
presumably) tend to think that by simply observing someone or something, we do not have 
any impact on it. However, when Lascaux's million-plus visitors observed those ancient 
paintings, they initiated the paintings' deterioration merely by exhaling. Of course, before this 
encounter with the image of the pony I knew that humans exhale carbon dioxide and that 
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the presence of this gas is a necessary condition for the possibility of plant and fungal 
growth. However in the encounter, it seemed that this insight was conveyed to me with an 
urgency that I had never before felt. After the shock of this realization, I became much more 
mindful of the fact that as a living, embodied presence, I will always be implicated in some 
sort of interdependent relation with that which surrounds me, and that with this 
interdependence comes a constant responsibility to the others in my environment. 
As I have just suggested, my own encounter with Lascaux led to a realization about 
myself that felt new to me. And if remaining open to an I-You encounter with another being, 
object or phenomenon results in realizations or insights that cannot be anticipated, I thus 
conclude that an encounter of this sort is in fact the origin ofmeaning and understanding in 
human life. My encounter, which shocked me into a new awareness of my body, could be 
likened to others' encounters that which inaugurated original insights. Ravidat's indescribable 
confrontation with Lascaux was surely so exhilarating because he and his friends were 
witnessing something that had not been seen by anybody for several millennia. Bataille, 
despite his laments that his visit to Lascaux was less than ideal compared to Ravidat's, 
nonetheless derived from his encounter enough philosophical insights to span the length of 
several essays and lectures. And although we do not know the intended purpose of the 
images, we can safely assume that the Magdalenian humans' depictions of animals on cave 
walls brought about a new understanding of the more-than-human others with which they 
shared a home in the Vezere River valley. Therefore, our ability to remain open to otherness 
before a space such as Lascaux will be the measure by which we participate in the cultivation 
of new meaning, which in tum allows us to immediately comprehend the nature of origin 
itself. 
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Moreover, if an encounter with otherness, by remaining outside the subject's 
ordinary network of meaning and offering new insight, is wondrous or enchanting, it follows 
that the discovery of origin within such an encounter is a decidedly aesthetic process. I thus 
reaff:u:m that we fmd the self-knowledge that we seek through a study of origins by 
remaining open to that which aesthetically captivates us, whatever that may be. In my 
concluding remarks, I will address the implications of this insight for our treatment of 
aesthetic objects that we explicidy associate with human origin, such as the ones discussed in 
this essay, as well as those typically regarded as outside the scope of this particular inquiry. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION: THE CREATION OF ORIGIN 
The premise of my essay, that we should look to the realm of the aesthetic in order 
to understand ourselves and our origin, is admittedly an unusual one. However, in my 
critiques of the ways in which humans have histori~ally engaged spaces and objects of 
"original" significance, I hope to have shown that our search for origin already has a 
fundamentally aesthetic dimension. In my 'first sustained discussion, I showed how a certain, 
pervasive concept of nature as "pure" of and "other" than human civilization is reinforced 
and mediated by artistic representations of nature both lofty and mundane. And in my 
second discussion, I argued that pre-historic images, such the cave paintings of Lascaux, are 
widely regarded as keys to understanding the earliest days of our species because the artistry 
of the images seems to signify that ancient humans had creative, self-conscious minds much 
like our own. So although there are other ways that we seek self-knowledge through a study 
of human origins, such as historical research, scientific inquiry and religious practice, I hope 
to have demonstrated that this sort of investigation can also take place in our regard for 
aesthetic objects. 
That said, I hope to have offered a compelling critique of the ways in which aesthetic 
objects are commonly engaged, so as to help articulate the relational comportment that I 
believe we should instead cultivate. As I indicated from the very beginning, I use Buber's 
notion of the I-You encounter as the template for my proposed mode of engagement. 
However, as it became clear throughout the course of this essay, this encounter is almost 
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impossible to describe. Although an encounter with a You is profoundly meaningful, as it is 
a precondition for subjectivity itself, the precise content and impact of such an encounter is 
dependent on the particular situation in which the two beings find themselves. Moreover, . 
the encounter is necessarily a fleeting one, lasting only as long as the subject is able to remain 
fully present with the other, and thus the full significance of the encounter cannot be 
articulated once the moment is past. As Buber notes, the I-You encounter gives rise to our 
capacity to meaningfully communicate with one another, but something about that 
encounter exceeds articulation. In I and Thou, he writes about a being after it has become a 
You for the subject: 
He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes and Shes, a dot in the world grid of 
space and time, nor a condition that can be experienced and described, a loose 
bundle of named qualities. Neighborless and seamless, he is You and fills the 
firmament. Not as if there were nothing but he; but everything else lives in his light.8s 
For Buber, a being that becomes a You in a present moment cannot be compared to others 
("no longer...limited by other Hes and Shes"), and cannot be described as an aggregate of its 
various features. As filling the "firmament" of the subject's world, the You is that which 
illuminates, or grants the world significance. In other words, the You gives way to 
signification, but its relation to the "I" prevents it from being subjected to the same sort of 
descriptive demarcation that it makes possible. 
The elusive nature of the I-You encounter thus poses a difficulty for any author 
who wishes to articulate the need to enter into relations of these sort. And for this reason, I 
chose to describe the nature of the encounter through negation, that is, by critiquing modes of 
engagement that fall short of this ideal relational comportment. This is why the majority of 
my first major discussion focused on the problems surrounding the prevalent human desire 
85 Buber, 59. 
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to engage nature as an uncorrupted, pre-historic "other" capable of restoring the socially 
alienated individual. And moreover, this is why the bulk of my second discussion centered 
on the various ways in which many scholars, tourists, and otherwise appreciators of Lascaux 
have failed to engage the ancient cave in such a way that accepts and respects its otherness 
from us. However, as I bring conclusion to this essay, I would like to discuss more directly 
the significance of the I-You encounter for human life, especially as it relates to aesthetics 
and the search for human origin. 
My discussion of Lascaux ended with the suggestion that unconditioned encounters 
with beings or phenomena other than oneself mark the origin of new meaning and insight for 
the subject. Moreover, this conclusion resonates with Bataille's claim that human life is made 
meaningful in moments filled with wonder or enchantment. If enchantment is an experience 
that falls under the domain of the aesthetic, moreover, it follows that a wondrous or 
enchanting encounter with an aesthetic object may be the source of new or original meaning 
in the encountering subject's life. Although the examples discussed in this essay have been 
aesthetic objects and sites explicitly associated with human origin, my conclusion is that 
insight into our origin does not come from the objects of our attention. Rather, it comes 
from our encounters with these objects, the success ofwhich is determined by our own 
willingness to remain open to the enchanting otherness that these objects offer us. If human 
origin cannot be understood through the object, but rather the encounter between subject 
and object, does this then mean that choice of object is unimportant? Can we understand 
primordiality by engaging artworks that, on the surface, have nothing to do with the question 
of origin? 
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Briefly put, my answer to this question is a conditional "yes." So long as a human 
subject gains new, original insight into herself and her life through her aesthetic engagement 
with a work, object or locale, she understands the nature of origin precisely because she is 
participating in it. However, to understand how this is possible requires us to think about the 
concept of "origin" in a different way than we have been thus far. It would not be quite 
correct to say that a subject, upon viewing a Monet or listening to Schoenberg for example, 
may gain from her experiences a new insight into what humans were like in the earliest days 
of the species. The origin that I speak of here is not an event that happened thousands of 
years ago, nor is it site whereby we may demarcate a precise set of preconditions for the 
birth of humanity. Rather, from this study, I conclude that human origin is an ongoing activity, 
one which is renewed with every individual, enchanting encounter between human subject 
and aesthetic object. 
Yet while the encounter is reframed as the source of "original" source of insight, we 
must also acknowledge that the meaning and value of the encounter depends equally on the 
history and situation of both subject and object. Thus my choice of focal examples in this 
essay was far from arbitrary. Although I have critiqued the ways in which we engage and 
interpret certain artistic representations of nature and pre-historic image-work, I chose these 
examples precisely because something about them resonates with many humans today. And, 
as I hope to have shown, ifwe recognize our desire to relate to these works of primordial 
significance as stemming mosdy from our own particular, historical situation, perhaps we 
will engage with them in a way that allows us to more closely attend to the unique, 
unprecedented, and indeed onginalinsights they hold for our lives. 
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At the end of his paralipomena on the origin of art, Adorno compellingly 
summarizes this point, when he argues that aesthetic engagement is itself the birth of human 
subjectivity: 
Ultimately, aesthetic comportment is to be defined as the capacity to shudder, as if 
goosebumps were the ftrst aesthetic image. What later came to be called subjectivity, 
freeing itself from the blind anxiety of the shudder, is at the same time the shudder's 
own development; life in the subject is nothing but what shudders, the reaction to 
the total spell that transcends the spell. Consciousness without shudder is reifted 
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consciousness. 
Adorno describes the aesthetic attitude as the "capacity to shudder," which I suggest would 
be our initial reaction before something that resonates with us, yet cannot be fully articulated 
within our ordinary spheres of meaning. He then argues that what we call "subjectivity" is in 
fact the development of this initial shudder, our continued response to the haunting 
otherness of the world that is somehow irreducible to its "spell" on us. In this sense, 
subjectivity is not a "given" quality of human consciousness. Rather it is (or should be) an 
ongoing process, constantly emerging out of an encounter with what lies just outside the 
individual's comprehension. The passage ends with a warning that we need to always retain 
this capacity to shudder before the world, for without it, we allow ourselves to become 
reifted, literally oiject-ifted. A person of reifted consciousness, unable to openly and 
spontaneously respond to the others she encounters, is thus unable to act responsiblY toward 
them. 
I thus hope to have shown something ofwhat it would take to reinvigorate a human 
subject's capacity for aesthetic shudder in the modem world. Although the desire to 
understand origin is pervasive in human life, I suggest that we may only ftnd what we look 
for ifwe vigilantly attune ourselves to the rich, complex and mysterious happenings of the 
86 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 331. 
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actual present, rather than allow our desire for agreeable solutions to our problems limit our 
perception of ourselves and others. I hope this discussion has shown that the aesthetic 
dimension of human life is key to understanding who were are and from whence we came, 
as it is the site of our ongoing self-creation. 
-- ------------------------
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